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INTRODUCTION
Every ten years, throughout America, state and local government
officials reapportion voting districts to bring them into line with the
new population figures revealed by the national Census. Reappor-
tionment is a highly potent political tool, enabling those who draw
districting lines to further their goals by manipulating the makeup of
various constituencies. There are two ways they do it. One is by ma-
nipulating the shape of the districts-namely, gerrymandering. The
other is by manipulating the size of district populations-creating
population differences among districts, thus establishing deviations
from the one person, one vote ideal.' Both means of furthering po-
litical objectives have frequently come under constitutional attack-
often when racial motivations were thrown into the picture, but also,
on many occasions, when pure politics was the motivating factor. In
the wake of the Supreme Court's recent split decision in Vieth v. Jube-
lirer2 in which a majority essentially held that virtually all forms of po-
litical gerrymandering are permissible exercises of legislative power
that do not violate the Equal Protection Clause,3 it seems odd that the
" Associate, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr L.L.P. B.A., Yale University, 1998; MA.,
University of Auckland, 2000; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2003. This Article was first inspired by
experiences working on a reapportionment case as a law clerk for the Honorable Stanley Mar-
cus of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Many thanks to Judge Mar-
cus for his guidance and encouragement.
It is true that even districts of perfect population equality hardly ever have the exact same
number of voters, since districts are typically reapportioned according to total population rather
than by the number of eligible, registered, or actual voters. The courts have generally preferred
using total population counts for apportionment. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-93
(1966) (expressing a preference for the use of total or citizen population over registered or ac-
tual voter numbers). But see Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 780-86 (9th Cir.
1990) (KozinskiJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that apportionment ac-
cording to number of voters, rather than total population, may be preferable).
2 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."). Numerous commentators have addressed the question of
whether, and to what degree, partisan gerrymandering is constitutionally permissible. See gener-
ally Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Practitioner, Theorist and Re-
former, in PoLrrIcAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 117, 128 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990)
(examining the political gerrymandering jurisprudence and discussing issues that remain unre-
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Supreme Court has yet to opine on whether partisan politics can be a
legitimate justification for deviations from one person, one vote
equality.
Although landmark decisions by the Warren Court established theS • 4
constitutional vitality of the one person, one vote principle, over the
past thirty years the Supreme Court has chipped away at this ideal, al-
lowing so-called "minor deviations" in population between voting dis-
tricts-particularly in state and local apportionment plans-when
solved); Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751 (2004) (argu-
ing for the adoption of a rule limiting the frequency of redistricting as a means of promoting
partisan fairness); John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable
Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489,
490 (2002) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)
(holding that the district court's finding that race rather than politics was the predominant fac-
tor in a state legislature's congressional redistricting plan was clearly erroneous), as an "offhand
approval" of partisan gerrymanders and racial stereotypes); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our
Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, "Fair Representation" and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt a "minimalist"
approach to racial and political gerrymandering so as to allow the appropriate political actors to
carry out their policymaking duties); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116
HARV. L. REV. 594 (2002) (proposing that authority to redistrict should be taken away from in-
sider political operatives, thus promoting a more competitive political process and rendering all
purposeful redistricting suspect); Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency:
Leading the Legislature to Police Itself 4J.L. & POL. 653 (1998) (arguing that court-imposed reme-
dies cannot protect incumbents, providing legislators with an incentive to redistrict legally so as
not to involve the courts); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Genymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002) (arguing
that redistricting authority should remain with incumbent politicians and that judges should
not strike down politically-motivated redistricting plans); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket:
Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1987)
(suggesting that political gerrymandering perpetuates the majority's political advantage and
therefore raises serious issues concerning the legitimacy of government, but arguing that ajudi-
cial remedy would be a greater evil).
4 See generally Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 715 (1964) (hold-
ing that the apportionment of the Colorado Senate under a newly adopted scheme substantially
departed from population-based representation and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (holding that neither house of the Delaware
General Assembly was apportioned substantially on a population basis); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678, 690 (1964) (holding that neither house of the Virginia General Assembly was sufficiently
apportioned on a population basis to satisfy constitutional requirements); Md. Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 673 (1964) (holding that Maryland's legislative repre-
sentation scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause because it created gross disparities from
population-based representation in the apportionment of Senate seats); WMCA, Inc. v. Lo-
menzo, 377 U.S. 633, 653-54 (1964) (holding that New York's apportionment plan violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it had a built-in bias against voters residing in more populous
counties); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-68 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause requires substantially equal representation for all citizens in a state regardless of where
they reside); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 18 (1964) (holding that the constitutional
requirement in Article I, Section 2, that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several
States" means that as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another person's vote); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding
that an equal protection challenge to a Tennessee apportionment statute presented ajusticiable
constitutional cause of action).
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adequately justified by legitimate state policies.5 Vieth affirmed that,
in virtually every case, political motivations may be the driving force
in the shape of districts, and redistricters may create districts of ut-
terly bizarre shapes for blatantly partisan reasons without running
into Equal Protection trouble. But can the creators of legislative re-
apportionment maps manipulate the size of districts for partisan rea-
sons? Is it permissible for map drawers to create population devia-
tions between voting districts to further partisan ends? As Justice
Scalia recently put it, the Supreme Court has never weighed in on
this issue with anything but "grand generalities"7 in cases that did not
directly address this question. The real action on this question has
taken place in the lower courts, which have come to varying-and of-
ten highly questionable-conclusions.
The political effects of population deviations in redistricting are
real and substantial. Although current deviations do not approach
the hundred-to-one population ratios that led to the Supreme Court's
early one person, one vote decisions, they still can often make the dif-
ference in which party has majority control over a legislature. Map
drawers are well aware of this fact, and are now able to use new redis-
tricting technologies to draw up new maps that maximize their politi-
cal advantages, with population deviations being among their most
potent tools. Consequently, a Supreme Court ruling on the permis-
sibility of partisan-inspired population deviations in reapportionment
could have a major impact on the political balance of power in many
states and localities.
As this Article will demonstrate, a review of the relevant case law
suggests that politics is not a permissible justification for even minor
population deviations between districts in state and local legislatures,
even if it is almost always a permissible cause of gerrymanders. This
analysis is based on several corollary findings: (1) the Court has sub-
jected population deviations in apportionment plans to far greater
scrutiny than it has to gerrymanders; (2) it has been exceedingly
critical of racially and regionally motivated deviations from perfect
population equality; (3) the justifications it has allowed for de mini-
mis population deviations in congressional districts do not include
partisan considerations; and (4) it has upheld lower courts that have
overturned state and local reapportionment plans that deviated from
perfect equality for political reasons. Despite this case law, the major-
ity of lower courts that have addressed challenges to population de-
5 See infra Parts I.A.2-3.
6 124 S. Ct. at 1792.
7 Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2809 (2004) (summarily affirming a district court judgment
that Georgia's legislative reapportionment plans violate the one-person, one-vote principle).
8 See infra Part I.B.
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viations in redistricting maps have given state and local officials a vir-
tual carte blanche to create deviations forjust about any reason, as long
as the deviations do not total more than ten percent.
Part I of this Article performs the first comprehensive survey of
the case law relating to politically motivated deviations from one per-
son, one vote equality, both in the Supreme Court and in the lower
courts. This review of the case law concludes that politics is a highly
suspect cause of even minor population deviations in reapportion-
ment plans. Part I also looks at the extent and political impact of the
population deviations that currently exist in state legislatures across
the country. Part II offers a constitutional standard for evaluating
challenges that allege that population deviations in reapportionment
plans are the result of partisan motives. This proposed standard-
based on an extrapolation from other areas of equal protection law-
addresses both the degree of influence that politics may have on re-
districting plans and the proper methods of proving that a plan ex-
ceeds the constitutional limits.
I. THE CASE LAw
A. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has developed a one person, one vote juris-
prudence that gives more leeway to state and local redistricting plans
than it does to congressional reapportionments, the latter of which
are also under state control pursuant to Article I of the Constitution.'
This Section looks at the Supreme Court's cases that have dealt with
population disparities in reapportionment, to determine how the
Court might treat population deviations that are the product of parti-
san motives. The Court has fully acknowledged that politics inevita-
bly play a major role in district reapportionment. 0 However, this sec-
tion demonstrates that although the Court allows "minor deviations"
resulting from efforts to further legitimate state policies in reappor-
tionment, partisan politics is not such a legitimate motive.
1. First Principles
As the Supreme Court has offered no direct guidance on the per-
missibility of using partisan considerations as a motivation for devia-
tions from one person, one vote, it is important to go back to the ear-
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3 & amend. XVII.
10 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (2004) (saying that "[a] determination that a
gerrymander violates the law must rest on something more than the conclusion that political
classifications were applied").
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liest one person, one vote cases to see how the Court's treatment of
population disparities in state and local reapportionments has
evolved. Though most of us view the right to an equally weighted
vote as central to our self-conception as citizens of a democracy, for a
long time the Supreme Court did not accept challenges to statutes
and apportionment plans in which some citizens' votes weighed far
more heavily than others." Until the early 1960s, the Supreme Court
never interfered in legislative redistricting challenges, 2 deeming
them to be nonjusticiable political questions." This changed with
Baker v. Carr,"4 the Warren Court's seminal one person, one vote case,
in which the Court held for the first time that challenges to voting
districting plans based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment were justiciable in federal courts. 5
Two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims 6 and its companion cases, 17 the
Court struck down various state legislative districts for their unequal
11 For discussions of the historical treatment of the one person, one vote ideal in America,
see Wesbeny v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1964); GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT
REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 16-22 (1966);
ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 16-
29 (1965); Gordon E. Baker, One Person, One Vote: "Fair and Effective Representation", in
REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 71, 72-74 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968); Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One
Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REv. 213, 217-25 (2003).
12 See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Conse-
quences, 24 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 104-05 (2000) (discussing how courts dealt with redis-
tricting problems before Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which held that an equal protection
challenge to a state apportionment statute presented a justiciable constitutional cause of ac-
tion).
See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion) (finding a chal-
lenge to a congressional apportionment plan nonjusticiable, stating that "the appellants ask of
this Court what is beyond its competence to grant" and that "[clourts ought not to enter this
political thicket"); see also DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 113 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the dramatic change in the Court's posture
regarding legislative apportionment in the 1960s).
14 369 U.S. 186 (1962). For comprehensive analyses of Baker and its aftermath, see AbnerJ.
Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L.
REV. 683, RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative Mirror, 18
CONST. COMMENT. 359, 361-82 (2001), and Symposium, Baker v. Carr: A Commemorative Sympo-
sium, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1103 (2002).
15 The Court reversed a dismissal of a challenge to Tennessee's existing apportionment
maps for its two state houses. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. The apportionment plans allotted one
representative for a county with 2,340 voters while granting only eight representatives to a
county of more than 312,000 voters. Id. at 237-38; see also id. at 262-64 (Clark, J., concurring)
(providing the number of representatives for and populations of each county). The state
House plan allowed rural voters comprising forty percent of the voting population to elect sixty-
three of the ninety-nine Representatives, and thirty-seven percent of the voting population to
elect twenty of the thirty-three Senators. Id. at 253.
" 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17 See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); Md.
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); WMCA, Inc. v. Lo-
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apportionment. Chief Justice Warren's Reynolds opinion stressed the
individual nature of voting rights:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected
by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a
representative form of government, and our legislatures are those in-
struments of government elected directly by and directly representative
of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fash-
ion is a bedrock of our political system.
Chief Justice Warren emphasized how the individual right to vote is
impaired if some votes count more than others, as they do when
some districts with equal legislative clout have unequal populations:
[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the
State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of
votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be con-
tended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had
not been effectively diluted. It would appear extraordinary to suggest
that a State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing
that certain of the State's voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only
once. And it is inconceivable that a state law to the effect that, in count-
ing votes for legislators, the votes of citizens in one part of the State
would be multiplied by two, five, or 10, while the votes of persons in an-
other area would be counted only at face value, could be constitutionally
sustainable. Of course, the effect of state legislative districting schemes
which give the same number of representatives to unequal numbers of
constituents is identical. 9
Chief Justice Warren went on to say that "[f] ull and effective partici-
pation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that
each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of mem-
bers of his state legislature. Modem and viable state government
needs, and the Constitution demands, no less."20 In a statement that
seems eerily at odds with the Court's subsequent treatment of parti-
san gerrymandering,1 ChiefJustice Warren declared:
[I]n a society ostensibly grounded on representative government, it
would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could
elect a majority of that State's legislators. To conclude differently, and to
menzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (NewYork); see alsoWesberryv. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (re-
quiring U.S. congressional districts within a state to be drawn on an equal population basis);
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (holding that a "county unit" system for counting
votes in Georgia's statewide Democratic primaries constituted unequal weighing of votes that
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
18 377 U.S. at 562.
19 Id. at 562-63.
20 Id. at 565.
21 See generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986).
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sanction minority control of state legislative bodies, would appear to deny
majority rights in a way that far surpasses any possible denial of minority
rights that might otherwise be thought to result.2 2
In perhaps the most forceful and audacious language of the opin-
ion, Chief Justice Warren stated that deviations from the principle of
one person, one vote for any reason were as constitutionally offensive
as racial restrictions on voting: "Diluting the weight of votes because
of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations
based upon factors such as race or economic status. 23 According to
the Court, "The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than sub-
stantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all
places as well as of all races." 4 The Reynolds Court also seemed to
deny that state policies and goals other than equal population repre-
sentation can override the constitutional need for equality:
We are admonished not to restrict the power of the States to impose dif-
fering views as to political philosophy on their citizens. We are cautioned
about the dangers of entering into political thickets and mathematical
quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected
rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no
less of us.
25
In justifying what opponents might call this intrusion on state sover-
eignty, the Court responded by quoting from its decision in Gomillion
v. Lightfoo 26 "When a State exercises power wholly within the domain
of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such
insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instru-
ment for circumventing a federally protected right."
27
After stating these fundamental principles, the Reynolds Court set
forth a legal rule that was forceful but not hopelessly idealistic:
By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis, we mean that the
Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good
faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as
nearly of equal population as is practicable."28
Perfect population equality is not required: "We realize that it is a
practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one
has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathe-
22 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
23 Id. at 566 (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
24 Id. at 565.
25 Id. at 566.
2 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
27 Id. at 347.
28 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577.
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matical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional re-
quirement.'9
What are the lessons of Reynolds? The opinion set out a strict
standard for state legislative apportionments: every districting
scheme has to be as close to perfect population equality as is possible
under the circumstances, no competing state policies are sufficient
justification for deviations, and any violation of this principle is as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause as denying a person the right to
vote on account of his race& If Reynolds-and no subsequent cases-
were applied in evaluating a redistricting plan with a total deviation
of just short of ten percent, and it was evident that a concerted effort
was made to reach ten percent deviation rather than perfect equality,
then the most likely result would be to jettison the plan as a Four-
teenth Amendment violation as egregious as the postbellum Grandfa-
ther Clauses. But, in deciding whether plans pass constitutional mus-
ter, it is necessary to examine to what extent the post-Reynolds one
person, one vote cases have chipped away at the strict ideals set forth
by the Warren Court in 1964.
In Roman v. Sincock,' 1 decided the same day as Reynolds, the Court
rejected the idea that a strict mathematical formula can be used to
decide whether an apportionment plan violates the Equal Protection
Clause:
Id. The Court acknowledged that total equality would be unrealistic, quoting a previous
case that said "[w]e must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it
were not allowed a little play in its joints." Id. at 577 n.57 (quoting Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson,
282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931)).
30 Some have criticized the one person, one vote rule. In his dissent in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), one of the companion cases to Reynolds, Justice
Stewart stated that the rule "finds no support in the words of the Constitution, in any prior de-
cision of this Court, or in the 175-year political history of our Federal Union." Id. at 746 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting). He argued that "[w]hat the Court has done is to convert a particular politi-
cal philosophy into a constitutional rule, binding upon each of the 50 States." Id. at 748. Other
commentators have propounded competing political philosophies in criticizing one person,
one vote, generally arguing that it unduly minimizes minority power. For example, Bruce Cain
states that the principle of one person, one vote violates the principles of Madisonianism, whose
"basic premise was that the popular will was best checked by institutions that were insulated
from public opinion, similar to courts, or by the competition between representatives from
various types of constituencies." Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist's Per-
spective, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1999). John Moeller argues that "[t]he solution the
courts have imposed ignores our Madisonian political tradition," because although it "calls for
majoritarian government," it "also calls for reflective representation, which means that the insti-
tutions will 'reflect the people in all their diversity, so that all the people may feel that their par-
ticular interests and even prejudices ... were brought to bear on the decision-making process.'"
John Moeller, The Supreme Court's Quest for Fair Politics, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 203, 213 (1984)
(quoting Alexander M. Bickel, Reapportionment and Liberal Myths, COMMENTS, June 1963, at 483,
491).
31 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
[Vol. 7:4
UNSAFE HARBORS
[T] he problem does not lend itself to any such uniform formula, and it is
neither practicable nor desirable to establish rigid mathematical stan-
dards for evaluating the constitutional validity of a state legislative appor-
tionment scheme under the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the proper
judicial approach is to ascertain whether, under the particular circum-
stances existing in the individual State whose legislative apportionment is
at issue, there has been a faithful adherence to a plan of population-
based representation, with such minor deviations only as may occur in
recognizing certain factors that are free from any taint of arbitrariness or
discrimination.32
It is this warning against "arbitrariness or discrimination," along with
Reynolds's mandate of creating plans as close to perfect equality as is
practicable, that set the standard for evaluations of deviations from
the one person, one vote ideal.
2. Limitation of the One Person, One Vote Ideal
In cases since Reynolds, the Court has appeared to widen the range
of deviation in district population size that it permits. It has not only
allowed some deviation from perfect population equality, but has also
allowed considerably larger deviations in state and local legislative
districts than it has allowed in congressional districts. In Reynolds
32 Id. at 710.
33 In contrast to the "ten percent" burden-shifting rule for state and local redistricting plans
discussed infra Part I.A.3, the Court has continued to hold congressional redistricting maps to a
very high standard of near-perfect equality. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), established
that "there are no de minimis population variations [for congressional reapportionment plans],
which could practicably be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard of Art. I, § 2, [sic]
withoutjustification." Id. at 734. For any deviation above zero, "no matter how small," the state
must justify it as furthering some legitimate state policy. Id. at 730 (quoting Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)). The Court struck down a NewJersey reapportionment plan
with a total deviation of 0.6984% from the average district because the state failed to offer any
legitimate justification for these deviations. See id. at 738, 742 (refusing to accept the proffered
justification of preserving the voting strength of racial minority groups). The Court rejected
the argument that the plan's deviation was "the functional equivalent of zero" since the popula-
tion deviation in the plan exceeded the margin of inaccuracy in the Census itself. Id. at 735; see
also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (striking down a Georgia congressional appor-
tionment plan in which the largest district had a population more than three times that of the
smallest one, and saying that congressional plans must be drawn on the principle that "as nearly
as is practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as an-
other's"); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 644-45 (N.D. Il1. 1991) (holding
that proponents of a congressional plan with a total population deviation of seventeen people
out of an ideal district population of 571,530 failed to adequately justify this deviation, render-
ing their plan unconstitutional). But see Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v.
State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 397 (D. Md. 1991) (upholding a congres-
sional plan with a deviation of ten people, considered to be a very small numerical variance
among congressional districts, but only because the court found that the deviation was justified
by an effort to give an incumbent congressman a safe seat and provide a majority black popula-
tion in the same area a chance to choose a representative). Since Karcher, state congressional
redistricting plans have had much more precise population equality, with extremely small dif-
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and some of its companion cases, the population deviations at issue
were truly immense, with some legislative districts having several
times as many people as others did. However, when the population
deviations in state and local plans were smaller, the Court allowed
some leeway when the defendant offered adecuate justification for
the deviations that did exist. In Abate v. Mundt, the Court approved
a reapportionment plan for the legislature of Rockland County, New
York that deviated by a total of 11.9% from perfect population equal-
ity. 5 The Court found that the deviations in the plan furthered a
"long tradition of overlapping functions and dual personnel in Rock-
land County government" and did not "contain a built-in bias tending
to favor particular political interests or geographic areas."36 Two years
later, in Mahan v. Howell 7 the Court allowed a reapportionment stat-
ute for the Virginia House of Delegates to remain in place, even
though its total population deviation was 16.4%.m The Court found
that this deviation was justified by an effort to maintain the integrity
of town and county lines.39
Later that year, Gaffney v. Cumming'4 established that "minor de-
viations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts
are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimi-
nation under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justifica-
tion by the State."4' In Gaffney, the Court reversed a lower court's
holding that the Connecticut legislative apportionment plans violated
the Equal Protection Clause when the maximum deviation was 7.83%
in the State Assembly and 1.81% in the Senate. A suit was brought
alleging that too many towns were split by the plan in an effort to
achieve a smaller deviation from perfect population equality, and to
ensure that the two parties' representation in the state legislature
ferences in population size. As of this writing, only ten states have total population deviations
that exceed one hundred people (out of an ideal population of more than 600,000) in their
congressional plans. National Conference of State Legislatures, Redisticting Population Deviation
2000, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/redistrict/redistpopdev.htm (last visited Feb.
2, 2005). Of the forty-three states with multiple congressional districts, twenty-nine have total
population deviations of ten people or less, and eighteen have a deviation of one or zero peo-
ple. Id.
403 U.S. 182 (1971).
35 Id. at 184.
36 Id. at 187.
37 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
38 Id. at 319.
See id. at 327 (rejecting the argument that traditional adherence to these lines is nojustifi-
cation for legislative reapportionment, and noting that the "[s]tate can scarcely be condemned
for simultaneously attempting to move toward smaller districts and to maintain the integrity of
its political subdivision lines").
40 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
41 Id. at 745.
42 Id. at 737.
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would be close to their overall support levels in the state. The three-
judge district court found for the plaintiffs, holding that "the devia-
tions from equality of populations of the Senate and House districts
[was] not justified by any sufficient state interest and that the Plan
denie[d] equal protection of the law to voters in the districts of
greater population."43 The lower court found that the "partisan po-
litical structuring... cannot be approved as a legitimate reason for
violating the requirement of numerical equality of population in dis-
tricting. '' 4
In reversing, the Supreme Court recognized that politics are an
inevitable and ubiquitous aspect of redistricting:
The very essence of districting is to produce a different-a more "politi-
cally fair"-result than would be reached with elections at large, in which
the winning party would take 100% of the legislative seats. Politics and
political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportion-
ment .... It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the loca-
tion and shape of districts may well determine the political complexion
of the area .... The reality is that districting inevitably has and is in-
41tended to have substantial political consequences.
The Court warned against making the constitutional standard of re-
districting so tough that it must always be taken out of the hands of
state legislatures and performed by courts: "[T]he goal of fair and
effective representation [is not] furthered by making the standards of
reapportionment so difficult to satisfy that the reapportionment task
is recurringly removed from legislative hands and performed by fed-
eral courts .... 46
Daniel Hays Lowenstein and Rick Hasen interpret (and state that
most practitioners interpret) Gaffney as stating that such deviations "at
the state level require no justification at all." However, a close read-
ing of the Gaffney opinion merely states that minor deviations fail to
constitute prima facie evidence of unconstitutionality, suggesting that
the burden falls to the plaintiffs in such cases rather than automati-
cally precluding finding an Equal Protection violation. Furthermore,
the unusual nature of the plan challenged (it was designed to create
bipartisan fairness) in Gaffney makes it questionable whether it applies
fully in challenges to plans designed to favor one party over another.
43 Id. at 739-40 (quoting Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139, 148 (D. Conn. 1972)).
Id. at 740 (quoting Cummings, 341 F. Supp. at 150).
45 Id. at 753.
4 Id. at 749.
47 LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 13, at 121.
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3. The Ten Percent Rule
Three subsequent cases established the so-called "ten percent
rule"-the notion that plans with total population deviations from
perfect equality of less than ten percent possess only "minor devia-
tions." The rule is not one that the Supreme Court declared defini-
tively at any specific time, but rather one that it gradually backed into
through a series of several opinions. The Court arrived at the ten
percent benchmark without explicitly explaining why this was a logi-
cal number to use in determining minor deviations in state and local
districting plans. In Brown v. Thompsonj the Court said that "[o]ur
decisions have established, as a general matter, that an apportion-
ment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls
within this category of minor deviations." 49 In making this statement,
the Court referred back to two previous cases: Connor v. Finch50 and
White v. Regester.5' In Connor, the Court, citing Gaffney and White,
stated that
The maximum population deviations of 16.5% in the [Mississippi] Sen-
ate districts and 19.3% in the House districts can hardly be characterized
as de minimis, they substantially exceed the 'under-10%' deviations the
Court has previously considered to be of prima facie constitutional valid-
52ity only in the context of legislatively enacted apportionments.
The original establishment of the ten percent line really occurred
in White, the other case cited in Brown. There, the Court held that a
9.9% deviation in a Texas legislative districting plan failed to make
out a prima facie Equal Protection Clause violation.3 The Court
stated:
Larger differences between districts would not be tolerable without justi-
fication 'based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation
of a rational state policy,' but here we are confident that appellees failed
to carry their burden of proof insofar as they sought to establish a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause from population variations alone.
54
Looking at that sentence in isolation might give the impression that
the Court was stating flat-out that deviations above 9.9% would re-
quire further justification by the state, while deviations of 9.9% or less
would not (or would at least shift the burden of demonstrating an
Equal Protection Clause violation to the plaintiffs). However, the
462 U.S. 835 (1983).
49 Id. at 842.
50 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
1 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
52 Connor, 431 U.S. at 418.
5 White, 412 U.S. at 762.
Id. at 764 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
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next sentences in the White opinion make it clear that the Court had
a more complicated calculus in mind:
The total variation between two districts was 9.9%, but the average devia-
tion of all House disiricts from the ideal was 1.82%. Only 23 districts, all
single-member, were overrepresented or underrepresented by more than
3%, and only three of those districts by more than 5%. We are unable to
conclude from these deviations alone that appellees satisfied the thresh-
old requirement of proving a prima facie case of invidious discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause.55
In other words, it was not just the 9.9% deviation that led the Court
to conclude that the Texas plan was not prima facie unconstitutional.
Instead, it was a 9.9% maximum deviation, combined with a 1.82%
average deviation and the fact that only a relatively small number of
the districts had significant deviations that created the presumption
of constitutionality.
So what are we to make of this ruling? Is a districting plan prima
facie unconstitutional if it has a maximum deviation over 9.9% and
an average deviation above 1.82%, or is just the former necessary? Or
is there some sort of two dimensional spectrum, with higher maxi-
mum deviations corresponding to lower average deviations, and vice
versa, in constitutional determinations? It is not clear what the Court
intended, but perhaps its statement in Brown that previous cases had
created the hard ten percent standard was a deliberate misreading or
oversimplification of the previous holdings.
The ten percent line appears to be something other than a safe
harbor below which all deviations are permissible. Rather, it is a bur-
den-shifting line, as Daly v. Hun?6 recognized: "The 10% de minimis
threshold recognized in Brown does not completely insulate a state's
districting plan from attack of any type. Instead, that level serves as
the determining point for allocating the burden of proof in a one
person, one vote case.- 57 That court concluded that "[t]o survive
summary judgment, the plaintiff would have to produce further evi-
dence to show that the apportionment process had a 'taint of arbi-
trariness or discrimination.' 5 8 The ten percent line was put in place
as a means of allocating the burden of proof: deviations above ten
percent are presumed unconstitutional, but this presumption is re-
buttable; deviations below ten percent are presumed constitutional,
and plaintiffs cannot simply point to the deviation and get a court to
hold that the plan is unconstitutional unless they can make some
other showing. This reading is backed up by a passage in Connor,
55 Id.
56 93 F.3d 1212 (4th Cir. 1996).
57 Id. at 1220.
58 Id. (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964)).
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which made clear that even minor deviations must be the result of an
effort to promote a legitimate state policy, and may not be created
willy-nilly or for plainly illegitimate reasons: "even a legislatively
crafted apportionment with deviations of [less than ten percent]
could be justified only if it were 'based on legitimate considerations
incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.'
59
4. Is Partisan Politics an Acceptable Cause of Deviations?
It is uncertain and debatable what exactly opponents of a district-
ing plan must prove to win an Equal Protection Clause challenge.
The Supreme Court, by its own admission, has never ruled on the
question of whether partisan politics is itself a legitimate state interest
that can justify some deviation from perfect population equality.
Some hints of how it might come down on this question can be
gleaned from several of its cases, however. Recently, in Cox v. Larios,
the Court summarily affirmed a Georgia district court's decision strik-
ing down that state's House and Senate plans. ° As the sole dissenter
from the summary affirmance, Justice Scalia argued that the case
should have been heard at oral argument because the district court's
opinion "assume [d] 'politics as usual' is not itself a 'traditional' redis-
tricting criterion."6' Thus, in his view, the rest of the Court erred in
refusing to give more consideration to an appeal from an opinion
that struck down a plan due to politically motivated deviations. How-
ever, because the Court affirmed the lower court without discussion,
it is impossible to know the reason why: was it because a majority be-
lieved that politics is an illegitimate consideration in redistricting (at
least insofar as it leads to population deviations) or because it read
the district court's decision as striking down the plans not for their
partisan motivation, but rather for other illegitimate reasons?
62
One way of looking at the question is to look at what the Court
has said are permissible justifications for the creation of population
deviations. In Karcher v. Daggett,63 the Court stated that "[a]ny num-
ber of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some vari-
ance [in district population size], including, for instance, making dis-
tricts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579).
60 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004), aff'g 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004). The district court de-
cision, on which I worked as clerk to one of the judges on the panel, is discussed at length infta.
61 Id. at 2809 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
62 See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1351 (stating that "it is unnecessary in this case to de-
cide whether partisan advantage alone would have been enough to justify minor population
deviations, although the Supreme Court has never sanctioned partisan advantage as a legitimate
justification for population deviations").
63 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
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of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Repre-
sentatives."64 This nonexclusive list includes ones, such as the protec-
tion of incumbents, that seem to have little obvious public benefit,
and yet the Court approves of them as reasons for deviations from
perfect population equality. Citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot,65 the Karcher
Court said that "as long as the criteria are nondiscriminatory, these
are all legitimate objectives that on a proper showing could justify
minor population deviations."6  The qualifier "as long as the criteria
are not discriminatory" is an interesting one, as it raises the question
of which kinds of discrimination the Court is talking about. Gomillion
was about race, so that's easy. But does discrimination against voters
or candidates from one political party count? And even if it does not,
are partisan motives even among the "consistently applied legislative
policies" that Karcher permitted as a reason behind district population
deviations?
Karcher, it is true, was a congressional apportionment case, rather
than a state or local reapportionment challenge. As discussed above,
state and local legislative plans get more leeway in population equal-
ity than do congressional plans. However, this does not mean that
Karcher's list of permissible motives is not a proper one for use in state
legislatures.67 The constitutional principle of one person, one vote
remains the same whether the reapportionment in question is fed-
eral, state, or local-the only distinction the Court has drawn is in the
size of deviation that is permissible, not the permissible cause of the
deviation.
Although the list of permissible policies in Karcher was clearly
meant to be a nonexhaustive one, the lack of any mention of partisan
politics on this list is striking, and may well have been an intentional
omission. Certainly, the Court was aware that population deviations
could be exploited for partisan gain, and it did mention other mo-
tives of a political character with dubious public value: "preserving
the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent
Representatives."6 In addition, all the policies mentioned in the
Karcher list are ones that typically appear as priorities in the redistrict-
ing guidelines that states and localities themselves publish69--and ef-
forts to undermine the other party never appear on such guidelines.
CA Id. at 740.
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740.
67 See supra text accompanying note 64.
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740.
The Alabama Reapportionment Committee Guidelines for Legislative and Congressional
Redistricting, for example, mandate that state legislative and congressional districts "will not
have either the purpose or the effect of diluting minority voting strength;" "will be composed of
contiguous and reasonably compact geography;" "should attempt to preserve communities of
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Language in Abate v. Mundt7° also suggests that the Court consid-
ers political favoritism in reapportionment to be on a par with re-
gional favoritism, and therefore an unconstitutional cause of popula-
tion deviations. The Court acknowledged that "local governments
may need considerable flexibility," thus "lend[ing] support to the ar-
gument that slightly greater percentage deviations may be tolerable
for local government apportionment schemes., 7' However, the Court
cautioned against "the danger of apportionment structures that con-
tain a built-in bias tending to favor particular geographic areas or po-
litical interests or which necessarily will tend to favor, for example, less
populous districts over their more highly populated neighbors.,
72
The Abate Court approved of the reapportionment plan it was evalu-
ating, but only because it saw "no such indigenous bias; there is no
suggestion that the Rockland County plan was designed to favor par-. ,,3 ••• 74
ticular groups. This language is, of course, pure dicta. Although
Abate has never been repudiated, it is far from clear that the later
Courts that showed so much tolerance for politically driven reappor-
tionment plans in Davis v. Bandem e and Vieth v. Jubelirer would
stand by the suggestion that population deviations cannot be created
to favor certain "political interests."
In sum, a comprehensive review of the Court's indirect state-
ments, implications, and omissions on the subject suggests that, for a
number of years, a majority has considered political manipulation to
be a suspect motive behind population deviations, even when the de-
viations are "minor." As the next section demonstrates, however,
most of the lower courts that have been asked to read between the
lines to determine the permissibility of partisan one person, one vote
deviations have not taken this view.
interest, including without limitation municipalities and concentrations of blacks and other
ethnic minorities;" "preserve cores of existing districts;" and that "Counties should be used as
district building blocks where possible." National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistrict-
ing Task Force, Appendix G: State Districting Principles: Alabama, available at http://www.senate.
leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/red2000/TAB5APPX.htm (last visitedJan. 31, 2005).
70 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (holding that a proposed plan which, under apparently good faith
practices, produced a total deviation from equality of 11.9% did not deny equal protection).
71 Id. at 185.
72 Id. at 185-86 (emphasis added) (citing Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 57 (1970)
("[W]hile voters in large school districts may frequently have less effective voting power than
residents of small districts, they can never have more.")).
73 Id. at 186.
74 The same, of course, could be said of some of the pertinent language in some of the other
cases discussed here, including Karcher.
75 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
76 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
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B. The Lower Courts
Since the Supreme Court has never directly opined on the per-
missibility of using population deviations for partisan ends, the lower
courts have been left to sort through which motives are permissible
and which are not. In the past fifteen years, the vast majority of lower
courts addressing recent challenges to state, county, or local district
maps with population deviations under ten percent have upheld the
plans. Most courts have granted quite a bit of leeway to plans that
stayed within a ten percent maximum deviation, with only a few ex-
ceptions.
1. Decisions Upholding Sub-Ten Percent Plans
In Fund for Accurate and Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 7 the
Northern District of New York rejected a one person, one vote chal-
lenge to a redistricting plan for the New York State Assembly with a
total population deviation of 9.43% .7 Interestingly, the court seemed
to equate a prima facie constitutional apportionment plan with an ir-
rebuttably constitutional plan. The court said that the plaintiffs'
"concession [that the total deviation was less than ten percent] is fatal
to the 'one person, one vote' claim because, absent credible evidence
that the maximum deviation exceeds 10 percent, plaintiffs fail to es-
tablish a prima facie case of discrimination under that principle suffi-
cient to warrant further analysis by this Court."79 The court's logic
appeared to misunderstand the very definition of "prima facie," since
it clearly gave the impression that it believed the inquiry ended with
the finding that the deviation was under ten percent. The court did
not say that the plaintiffs failed to offer convincing evidence that the
cause of the 9.43% deviation was illegitimate; rather, it simply as-
sumed that ten percent created a safe harbor.
Similar reasoning prevailed in Gorin v. Karpan,8' an opinion seem-
ingly divided against itself. A three-judge court upheld Wyoming's
Apportionment Act, which created a population deviation of 9.602%
for the state Senate and 9.973% for the state House of Representa-
tives. 2 In determining the proper standard to apply to plans with
77 796 F. Supp. 662 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (per curiam).
78 See id. at 668 ("[A]bsent credible evidence that the maximum deviation exceeds 10 per-
cent plaintiffs fail to establish a primafacie case of discrimination under that principle sufficient
to warrant further analysis by this Court.").
79 Id.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1228 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "prima facie" as meaning "[a]t
first sight; on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information" (emphasis added)).
81 788 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Wyo. 1992).
See id. at 1201 ("The range of relative population deviation for the Senate is 9.602%....
The range of relative population deviation for the House is 9.973%.").
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under-ten percent deviations, the court seemed to contradict itself.
First, it quoted its own previous decision in an earlier incarnation of
the same case, saying that for plans with deviations under ten per-
cent, "the State must demonstrate a rational policy supported by le-
gitimate considerations in the effectuation of that policy." 3 But then,
just five paragraphs later, the court appeared to give sub-ten percent
plans a safe harbor saying that "[t]he ten percent de minimis rule
provides the state need only justify relative population deviation
ranges greater than 10%. ' '84 The court did not even acknowledge, let
alone explain, this apparent self-contradiction. Instead, it simply
concluded that because "[t]he maximum ranges of deviation under
the 1992 plan clearly fall below" the ten percent line, the Apportion-
ment Act "achieved the overriding constitutional objective of substan-
tial equality of population among the various legislative districts-the
vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any
other citizen in Wyoming" and was therefore constitutional.5 In fact,
the court went so far as to laud the drafters of the plans for their con-
scientiousness, saying that "[w] e appreciate the enormity and inher-
ent difficulty of legislative reapportionment and we commend the
Wyoming Legislature for its efforts."
86
Twelve years later, Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schae-
fer 7 established a standard for evaluation of sub-ten percent popula-
tion deviations that several district courts have since followed. A
three-judge court8 upheld Maryland's redistricting plans for both the
state Senate, which had a deviation of 9.84%, and the state House of
83 Id. at 1201 (quoting Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1446 (D. Wyo. 1991) (holding
Wyoming's 1991 Legislative Reapportionment Act to be in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause)).
84 Id.
Id.
86 Id. Chief Judge Brimmer, though he concurred in the result, was not so kind. He wrote
that his "concurrence should not be construed as even half-hearted approval of the 1992 Ap-
portionment Act, for the Wyoming State Legislature was mighty careless of justice, to say the
very least." Id. at 1202 (Brimmer, CJ., concurring). He felt that in passing the plans, the legis-
lature "closed its eyes to the geographic realities and the practical needs of vast areas of our
State by its late-night passage of" an amendment to the Act that was "deliberately indifferent to
the voters of" several counties. Id. He rather understatedly opined that "I hope that aroused
voters will properly sear and baste those who drafted, promulgated and passed the [amendment
in question]; they richly deserve it." Id. at 1203. He only concurred with the majority opinion
because "the record before us (which doesn't have the strength of Pablum) leaves no alterna-
tive." Id. at 1202.
87 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1048 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that showing a general pattern of racially
polarized voting does not, by itself, require the redrawing of district lines to "maximize the
number of majority-black districts").
88 Federal law prescribes that a district court of three judges--two federal district judges and
one federal circuit judge-be convened to preside over any trial challenging the constitutional-
ity of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legis-
lative body. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), (b)(1) (2004).
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Delegates, with a total deviation above ten percent (10.67%) .89 Dis-
cussing the standard that must be met to successfully challenge a plan
with a population deviation of less than ten percent, the court said
that the plaintiffs "must prove the minor population deviation is not
caused by the promotion of legitimate state policies" but by "uncon-
stitutional or irrational" ones.9 For an example of an "unconstitu-
tional or irrational state policy," the court offered "[r]acial discrimi-
nation or a state policy of purposefully disfavoring counties whose
names begin with the letter 'C."'9' In other words, the court seemed
to be saying that only plans creating deviations either discriminating
based on the most constitutionally suspect of characteristics or pro-
moting utterly nonsensical goals would fail to pass muster if the de-
viations were less than ten percent.
92
The court also said it could strike down plans with deviations of
less than ten percent only if the illegitimate policy is the sole reason
for the population deviation. "To prevail," the court said, "the plain-
tiffs have the burden of showing that the deviation in the plan results
89 Marylanders, 849 F. Supp. at 1033-36. As for the Senate plan, the court found unconvinc-
ing two arguments put forth for striking it down. First, the plaintiffs alleged, the drafters of the
Senate plan did not even try to get an equal plan, but merely tried to keep it within "plus or mi-
nus five percent of the ideal population." Id. at 1034. The court said that there was nothing
wrong with this, as "[t]he Supreme Court has expressly provided States with a degree of flexibil-
ity, i.e., a ten percent population deviation, in formulating a state legislative districting plan be-
cause of the legitimate state interests that might cause deviations from absolute population
equality." Id. Second, the plaintiffs claimed that the Senate plan was unconstitutional because
an objective of the creation of the deviations was to provide the City of Baltimore with at least
eight Senate seats (a number that the city's population did not otherwise warrant). Id. at 1035.
But the court discounted this allegation, because it was "unable to locate anywhere in the re-
cord any evidence, other than conclusory assertions, that the deviation in the senate plan was
caused by this objective." Id. at 1036. In a footnote, the court looked at Reynolds, Abate, and
Hadley and declared that it was "far from convinced that the Constitution prohibits a State from
making the political determination that a region's or political subdivision's representation
should be maximized." Id. at 1035 n.12. Ten years later, the Larios court would reach a very
different result on this question, finding that population deviations in Georgia's state redistrict-
ing plans that deliberately favored certain regions of a state over others were impermissible and
that the plans "must be struck down on this basis alone." Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320,
1342 (2004).
The Marylanders court upheld the House of Delegates plan, despite its over-ten percent de-
viation, because the Director of the Maryland Office of Planning stated-and the plaintiffs
never attempted to refute-that all four of the districts in the plan that had deviations greater
than +5 percent were created to further legitimate state policies. See Marylanders, 849 F. Supp. at
1037 ("MFR simply has advanced no evidence to refute that these deviations were based on le-
gitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of rational state policies."). Namely, ac-
cording to the Office of Planning Director, the deviations were caused by an effort to preserve
county and town lines, natural boundaries, and the cores of prior districts. Id.
90 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1032.
91 Id. at 1032 n.8.
92 For population deviations above ten percent, the Marylanders court said that "[t]he State
has the burden of demonstrating that the plan may reasonably be said to advance a rational
state policy, such as those listed in the Karcherdecision." Id. at 1032.
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solely from the promotion of an unconstitutional or irrational state
policy.' 9  Thus, apparently, the Marylanders standard would allow a
defense if a legitimate policy was merely part of the cause of the popu-
lation deviation.
Two years later, in Daly v. Hunt,9 4 the Fourth Circuit, in a case on
appeal from the Western District of North Carolina, looked at a plan
for the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Education of
Mecklenburg County that had a maximum population deviation of
8.33%. After reviewing the general principle of one person, one vote
as laid out in Reynolds v. SiMs95 and the allowance of minor deviations
in Gaffney v. Cummings, White v. Regester,97 and Brown v. Thompson,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the proper line for de-
termining "minor deviations" was not necessarily ten percent in all99
cases. The court acknowledged that the ten percent line does not
create a safe harbor; rather, it is a burden-shifting line below which
the plaintiffs have the responsibility to establish a constitutional viola-
tion, and above which the defendant has to prove that the deviations
were necessary to further a legitimate state goal. 1 °
Below ten percent, according to the Daly court, "the population
disparity is considered de minimis and the plaintiff cannot rely on it
alone to prove invidious discrimination or arbitrariness. To survive
summary judgment, the plaintiff would have to produce further evi-
dence to show that the apportionment process had a 'taint of arbi-
trariness or discrimination. 101 However, the court never spelled out
its view of what such a "taint" could entail. It suggested that a sub-ten
percent deviation plan could be challenged for violating the Voting
Rights Act or for being an unconstitutional racial gerrymander,' but
of course these are completely separate rights of action that allow
plaintiffs to challenge plans even with perfect population equality.
The court did not mention any type of successful one person, one
vote challenge to a sub-ten percent deviation plan that could con-
ceivably succeed under its standard without also violating some other,
93 Id. (emphasis added).
93 F.3d 1212 (4th Cir. 1996).
95 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
412 U.S. 735 (1973).
97 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
98 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
Daly, 93 F.3d at 1220 ("Second, the Court's apportionment decisions... indicate the
Court's willingness to recognize a de minimis level below which population variances are deemed
acceptable.").
100 See id. ("The 10% de minimis threshold recognized in Brown does not completely insulate a
state's districting plan from attack of any type. Instead, that level serves as the determining
point for allocating the burden of proof in a one person, one vote case.").
101 Id. (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964)).
102 Id. at 1220-21.
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distinct constitutional standard. This calls into question whether the
Daly court truly believed that ten percent is not a safe harbor. It left
the question whether "the apportionment plan at issue here was the
product of bad faith, arbitrariness, or invidious discrimination" to the
district court on remand. 3
More recently, in Montiel v. Davis,0 4 a three-judge court upheld
the Alabama state House and Senate plans, which had population de-
viations of 9.93% and 9.78%, respectively.05 The court's analysis of
the challenge was relatively brief, relying largely on the Daly view that
a sub-ten percent plan violates the Equal Protection Clause only if it
,,106has the "taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. The court quoted
Marylanders' holding that plaintiffs in this type of case have "the bur-
den of showing that the 'minor' deviation in the plan results solely
from the promotion of an unconstitutional or irrational state pol-
icy,' ' 0 7 and concluded that "[p]laintiffs have simply failed to carry
their burden."0 The court did not, however, actually specify that
what the plaintiffs alleged was the cause of the population deviations.
In upholding the plans, the court pointed out that the
"[p]laintiffs have proffered no evidence to refute the abundant evi-
dence submitted by the defendants and defendant-intervenors which
establishes that... [the plans] were the product of the Democratic
Legislators' partisan political objective to design Senate and House
plans that would preserve their respective Democratic majorities. ' °9
The court thus seemed to imply that partisan motivation was a defense
against the one person, one vote (and gerrymandering) challenges.
It never stated outright that partisan advantage was a permissible mo-
tivation for the population deviations, but this was clearly a central
rationale of the opinion.
In 2003, the Eastern District of New York in Cecere v. County of Nas-
sau articulated the clearest judicial statement yet, finding that baldly
political considerations are a permissible cause of sub-ten percent
population deviations in state and local redistricting plans. The
Democrats of the Nassau County Legislature, which held a 10-9 ma-
jority, enacted a redistricting plan that, as the plaintiffs described it,
103 Id. at 1222. The court also reversed the district court's use of voting-age population,
rather than total population, in conducting its one person, one vote analysis. Id. at 1228. The
district court's post-remand order is not published.
104 215 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
105 Id. at 1282, 1286.
106 Id. at 1285 (quoting Daly, 93 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Roman, 377 U.S. at 710)).
107 Id. at 1286 (emphasis added) (quoting Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schae-
fer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (D. Md. 1994)).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1283.
110 274 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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consisted of "a hodgepodge of misshapen districts in which various
towns, villages and communities are unnecessarily divided.". The
total population deviation of the districts in the Nassau County plan
was 8.94%,"' and according to the plaintiffs, the plan dramatically in-
creased the number of village, community, and town lines that were
divided.1 3 Democrats admitted that the choice to create population
deviations and irregular district shapes was "motivated by an effort to
strengthen Democratic candidates in many districts" and "that the fi-
nal map 'gives us [the Nassau County Democratic Party] a more
competitive chance and minimizes the impact of the Republican ma-
ch in e ." '
' ' 4
Ultimately, the court granted the County's motion to dismiss."5
The court held that "rank partisanship by the Democratic majority
with a resulting inordinate division of towns, villages and communi-
ties... is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 6 A section
heading of the opinion stated that "Even if Local Law 2-2003 was
Promulgated for Political Reasons (i.e., to Benefit Democratic Candi-
dates and Disadvantage Republican Candidates), as Plaintiffs Allege,
That Alone is not Violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
7
The Cecere court's reasoning was based largely on Gaffney," 8 which
acknowledged that "districting inevitably has and is intended to have
substantial political consequences. " ' 9 The Cecere court acknowledged
that the plan at issue in Gaffney was different from the Nassau County
plan because it was (1) designed to make the two parties' representa-
tion in the legislature more closely match their relative support among
voters in the state rather than the opposite goal of giving one party an
extra advantage in the legislature beyond its overall popularity among
voters, as in Cecere, and (2) "the primary focus of the challenge in
Gaffney was upon the allegedly unnecessary division of so many towns.
That argument was based on the anomalous proposition that the
Board went too far in endeavoring to promote equality, i.e., the de-
viation rate was unnecessarily low.' 20  Nonetheless, the New York
court found Gaffney instructive because it
III Id. at 309.
112 Id. at 311.
"' Id. at 310.
114 Id. (alteration in original).
11 Id. at 309.
116 Id. at 313.
117 Id.
18 Id. at 315 (stating that Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), is instructive because it
"underscores that redistricting is essentially a political and legislative process").
19 Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
120 Cecere, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
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(1) underscores that redistricting is essentially a political and legislative
process and (2) found that a maximum deviation rate of 7.83% in a non-
congressional redistricting case was insufficient, as a matter of law, to es-
tablish a prima facie violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the con-
text of a pure 'one person, one vote' challenge.
121
Of these two reasons, the latter is undoubtedly true: a population
deviation of 7.83%, like any number below ten percent, is prima fa-
cie-though not irrebuttably-constitutional. But the first reason
fails to convince because it reads Gaffney as taking a more radical po-
sition than it really did. Gaffney quite sensibly recognized that politics
have been, and will always be, part of redistricting, and that this was
made inevitable (and, for all we know, intentional) by Article I of the
Constitution, which gave state legislatures the power to set congres-
sional districts.'22 But it did not say that there are absolutely no limits
to partisan shenanigans, particularly in cases, as in Cecere (and most
political gerrymandering cases), where the intent of the redistricting
was not to make the resulting party split in the state legislature "more
fair," but rather quite the opposite. And Gaffney certainly did not
deal with a plan whose one-sided partisan motivation was so egre-
gious; on the contrary, that litigation was brought to contest a plan
that bent over backwards to be fair to voters and politicians from both
parties. The Gaffney decision did not contemplate plans with numer-
ous Democratic districts 4.9% smaller than average and numerous
Republican districts 4.9% larger (or vice versa), and nothing in the
language of the opinion indicates that it covers such situations. Its
broad statements about the inevitability of politics in redistricting do
not give the impression that the Court was giving state parties carte
121 Id.
12 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2-3. As Luis Fuentes-Rohwer argues, it is literally impossible to
draw up a redistricting plan that is truly "apolitical":
The claim is fairly undisputed: redistricting has intensely partisan qualities. Compound-
ing matters, this is also a process with an implicit zero-sum, win-lose quality. Put another
way, it is impossible to carve out districts in a politically "neutral" way. No matter which
way we slice a given jurisdiction, neutral lines simply do not and will not exist; any one
line drawn in any given place will benefit one party, hinder the other. This reality is in-
herent to any redistricting model under a two-party system.
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, "Fair Representation" and an Exe-
gesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 527, 536-37 (2003) (footnotes omitted). Al-
though this is true as far as it goes, all redistricting plans are not equally "political" in the sense
that they do not all equally reflect a conscious intent to create a result that favors a particular
party or individual politicians.
123 It is actually highly debatable whether a bipartisan agreement to split up a state is really
more desirable and less constitutionally offensive than a situation in which one party rigs the
system to favor itself over its rival. In a system of one party control, disillusioned voters at least
have the hope that the other party will eventually gain control and turn things around. When
both parties collude in splitting up power, there is no real chance of any change. For an expla-
nation of this viewpoint, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L.
REv. 593, 598-99 (2002).
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blanche to do everything in the parties' power to maximize their parti-
san advantage as long as they kept deviations under ten percent.
Recently, in Rodriguez v. Pataki, 24 the Southern District of New
York upheld the New York State Senate redistricting plan against a
one person, one vote challenge. The total population deviation in
the plan was 9.78%, and the average deviation from the ideal district
size was 2.22%.125 The court said that the proper legal standard to
apply to sub-ten percent plans was the Marylanders standard-namely,
whether "the plan was adopted based on 'unconstitutional or irra-• , ,,126
tional' reasons. The court said that population deviations under
ten percent are prima facie constitutional, but acknowledged that
"[c]ompliance with Brown's 'ten percent rule' does not end the in-
quiry. There is still a question of how the 'ten percent rule' dovetails
with Reynolds and its progeny, which require a 'good faith effort' by
the state to achieve districts 'as nearly of equal population as is prac-
ticable."1 27 The court also cited Marylanders for the proposition that
"the plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the deviation in the
plan results solely from the promotion of an unconstitutional or irra-
tional state policy. , 2 8 The court justified this rule by pointing out
that
If the burden on the plaintiffs in minor-deviation cases were anything less
than this substantial showing, then the plaintiffs would be able to chal-
lenge any minimally deviant redistricting scheme based upon scant evi-
dence of ill will by district planners, thereby creating costly trials and
frustrating the purpose of Brown's 'ten percent rule.'
2
Applying this standard, the court found that the New York Senate
plan passed with flying colors. The court found that the plan "re-
flects traditional districting principles including: maintaining equal-
ity of population, preserving the 'cores' of existing districts, prevent-
ing contests between incumbents, and complying with the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act.' 130 The court gave no weight
to the argument that the drafters' plain desire to stay within ten per-
cent, rather than to get to zero deviation, was an Equal Protection
Clause violation, finding that "an express objective of staying within a
ten-percent deviation while pursuing other legitimate goals provides
124 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (per curiam).
125 Id. at 356.
125 Id. at 362 (citing Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022,
1032 (D. Md. 1994)).
127 Id. at 364 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964)).
128 Id. at 365 (quoting Marylanders, 849 F. Supp. at 1032).
129 Id.
1 Id. at 352 (citing Marylanders, 849 F. Supp. at 1056, and Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d
1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (per curiam)).
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no support to the plaintiffs' claim of invidious or arbitrary discrimina-
tion or of bad faith."131
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Senate
plan impermissibly discriminated against "downstate" New York by
overpopulating districts in the southern part of the state and under-
populating districts in the north. Most interestingly, the court dis-
counted an advisory memorandum to the Republican co-chair of the
reapportionment task force that suggested that creating a new, pre-
dominantly Democratic Senate district in Long Island would "com-
bine politically undesirable areas." 13 2 The court found no invidious
discrimination in such tactics, saying that it was not "surprising that a
memorandum to the Republican State Senate in control of redistrict-
ing would describe a potential Democratic district as comprised of
undesirable' voters. In other words, the court again seemed to be
saying, partisan favoritism is a defense against accusations of regional
favoritism. The court pointed out that the plaintiffs should have
made a gerrymandering claim if they were alleging political discrimi-
nation on this basis,1 3 4 though it seemed to discount the possibility
that such a claim was not brought because the standard for partisan
gerrymandering under Davis v. Bandemer 5 was virtually impossible to
meet, and the plaintiffs believed that partisan-inspired deviations
from population equality are held to a tougher standard of justifica-
tion than are partisan gerrymanders.
131 Id. at 367.
132 Id. The court had several other reasons for rejecting the regional argument. First, the
court questioned the very credibility of the claim that this regional favoritism was a deliberate
policy. See id. at 367-68 (noting that more is needed than a mere assertion of regional dis-
crimination; some form of evidence is required). Second, the court said that other, clearly le-
gitimate state goals were at least partly responsible for the deviations, saying that the creators of
the plan were "interested in contiguity, compactness, preserving the cores of existing districts,
desiring not to pit incumbents against one another, respecting then-current political subdivi-
sions and county lines, and staying within the ten-percent-deviation parameter of Brown." Id. at
367. Third, the court said that "to the extent that the plaintiffs seek to use the regional aspect
of their claim as a proxy for a claim to that a group of voters were systematically disadvantaged,
their proposed definitions of 'upstate' and 'downstate' are self-serving and defective," because
their definitions of these regions were unconvincing. Id. at 369. Fourth, even if the districts
were all of perfectly equal population (but kept the same essential shapes), "the difference in
'downstate' representation from what was accorded under the enacted plan would be insignifi-
cant." Id.
133 Id. at 368.
34 See id. ("[W]e cannot understand what invidious discrimination this phrase supposedly
signals: there is no political or racial gerrymandering claim embedded in this count.. .
135 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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2. Effect of Rulings Upholding Sub-Ten Percent Plans
Many of the cases detailed above seem to place politically moti-
vated population deviations on a par with political gerrymandering,
and therefore nearly impossible to strike down. With three excep-
tions discussed below, every other recent court to examine a redis-
tricting plan with a total population deviation under ten percent has
also upheld it.136 Part of this reluctance seems to be tied in with the
"unconstitutional or irrational" standard for such deviations first pro-
pounded in Marylanders,1
37 and cited by several courts since then.
1 8
Where does this standard come from? The court cited Karcher v.
Daggett"39 as creating an "unconstitutional or irrational" standard.
40
But that standard is nowhere to be found in the section of Karcher
that Marylanders cited.'4' And it is certainly not obvious that Karcher
said that partisan motives always got a pass under this standard as they
are neither unconstitutional nor irrational. Reading Karcher gives the
impression of a tougher standard ofjustification than the Marylanders
and Cecere courts read into it. Nowhere does the Karcher opinion state
that in cases of minor deviation, the plaintiffs have to show that the
deviation is the result of an irrational or unconstitutional state policy.
What it does say is that "we are willing to defer to state legislative
policies, so long as they are consistent with constitutional norms, even
if they require small differences in the population of congressional
districts."' 42 It also says that a state "could justify small variations in
the census-based population of its congressional districts on the basis
of some legitimate, consistently applied policy."143
The "unconstitutional or irrational" standard also seems rather
circular. Read literally, it means that a plan violates the Equal Protec-
13 See, e.g., Holloway v. Hechler, 817 F. Supp. 617, 623-24 (S.D. W. Va. 1992) (holding that
the reapportionment plan for the West Virginia House of Delegates, with a total population
deviation of 9.97%, did not violate the one person, one vote principle); Farnum v. Bums, 561 F.
Supp. 83, 92-93 (D.R.I. 1983) (holding that a proposed reapportionment plan for the Rhode
Island state Senate did not violate federal one person, one vote principles, and that the use of a
"population window" in determining district size was permissible, although the plan did violate
Rhode Island state constitutional principles).
137 Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (D. Md.
1994).
138 See Rodriguez, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 362 ("[T]he plaintiffs must produce evidence that raises a
genuine issue of fact as to whether the plan was adopted based on 'unconstitutional or irra-
tional' reasons."); Cecere v. County of Nassau, 274 F. Supp. 2d 308, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
the "unconstitutional or irrational" language from Marylanders); Montiel v. Davis, 215 F. Supp.
2d 1279, 1284 n.6 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (same).
139 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
40 Marylanders, 849 F. Supp. at 1032.
1 See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740-44.
142 Id. at 740 (citing White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-97 (1983)).
'43 Id. at 741.
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tion Clause if it is unconstitutional, namely that it is unconstitutional
if it is unconstitutional. It leaves out the money question, which is
rather what kinds of motivations behind population deviations do not
pass Equal Protection Clause muster.
3. Rulings Striking Down Sub-Ten Percent Plans
Only three lower courts in the era of the ten percent rule have
struck down redistricting plans whose population deviations were po-
litically motivated. Because these three cases had wildly varying rea-
soning, it is worth going into each of them in some detail to see how
they contrast with the more numerous decisions that upheld such
plans. First, in Vigo County Republican Central Committee v. Vigo County
Commissioners,'" the Southern District of Indiana held that the redis-
tricting plan for the county commission violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The court acknowledged that it "treads carefully into this
arena, given the principles of federalism and the separation of pow-
ers on which our republican form of government is founded.'
45
Nonetheless, the opinion said, "[i]f this court failed to act, some of
the voters of Vigo County, Indiana would be in danger of losing the
equality of voting promised to them by law."
14 6
The 1990 Census revealed that the existing district map for the
county commission, which had been passed in 1974, had a total
population deviation of thirty-seven percent.147 A suit was brought
challenging the plans, and the defendant Commissioners admitted
that the map violated the.Equal Protection Clause. 148 The Commis-
sioners then hired a redistricting expert to redraw the maps, instruct-
ing him only to reduce the deviation below ten percent.! 9 He drew
up a plan with a total deviation of 8.41%.150 The plaintiffs amended
their complaint, alleging that the new plan "violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because the Commissioners did not make a good faith
effort to create districts with the smallest population deviation possi-
ble." 5' The Commissioners then went back and asked their expert to
try to lower the population deviations still further, and he came up
with a map with a 3.8% total deviation. The plaintiffs still were not
144 834 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
145 Id. at 1082.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1083.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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satisfied, however, and presented to the court a proposed plan with a
total deviation of 0.41%.5s
The court agreed that even the 3.8% plan violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, citing the Court's admonition in Gaffney v. Cummings
that a state or local governmental entity must make "an honest and
good-faith effort to construct its districts 'as nearly of equal popula-
tion as is practicable,' but ... absolute equality [is] a 'practical impos-
sibility."' | 4 Interestingly, the court denied that the fact that the devia-
tion was less than ten percent made the plan prima facie
constitutional. Instead, the court said that " [i]f a state or local unit of
government makes a good faith effort to comply with federal and state
redistricting laws, any plan with a population deviation of less than
10% is presumed to be constitutional.', 5 5 The court said that because
the Vigo County plan was not the product of a good faith effort to
achieve equality, the plan was not even entitled to the initial pre-
sumption of constitutionality:
Notably, the Commissioners did not redistrict until they were forced to
do so by this lawsuit. Had the Commissioners' 1974 Plan been within the
10% de minimis threshold when the Plaintiffs' filed suit, the court would
not have found, without more, a presumption of violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. However, the threshold test does not apply when a
case is already in court precisely because the reapportionment plan at is-
sue was far beyond the de minimis threshold. In other words, because
the court is engaged in active scrutiny of the Commissioners' plan pursu-
ant to an ongoing lawsuit, the Commissioners may not simply draw up a
revised plan with less than a 10% deviation and expect to be exempted
from explaining why a plan with a lower deviation was not adopted. 5T
Thus, the court found, because the plan was drawn up only to
avoid the consequences of the suit, the plan "is not a good faith effort
to make the population as equal as possible," and was therefore
prima facie unconstitutional even though its total deviation was less
than ten percent. 5 7 Consequently, according to the court, the bur-
den was on the defendants to demonstrate that the deviations were
caused by legitimate state policies, and were no larger than necessary
to support these policies.3' The court found that "[tfhe Commis-
sioners offered no explanation for the deviation," 59 and thus it had
no reason to believe that the deviations were caused by the legitimate
state interests of "[k]eeping districts contiguous, keeping them com-
153 Id.
15 Id. at 1084-85 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743 (1973)),
155 Id. at 1085 (citing Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983)).
156 Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,414-18 (1977)).
157 Id. at 1086.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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pact, following natural boundaries, not crossing precinct lines, and
including whole townships."''0 Even assuming the plan did evince an
effort to promote these interests, however, the court also said that the
defendants failed to show that the deviation was not larger than nec-
essary to promote them. According to the court, "they cannot make
such a showing if the Plaintiffs' Plan contains a smaller deviation and
serves those state interests substantially as well." 61 Thus, because the
plaintiffs' plan had a smaller deviation (0.41%) than the existing
plan, the defendant's plan was plainly unconstitutional.
The Vigo ruling was highly anomalous in several ways.162 First-
unlike any other lower court ruling-it said that a plan with a popula-
tion deviation under ten percent could still be prima facie unconsti-
tutional if it was not a good faith effort to achieve population equality.
This was in stark contrast to a number of other courts, which plainly
held that sub-ten percent are prima facie permissible, period. Thehel tat t  l~r nt 1rep4 165 "P , _ 6
courts in Cecere,' Weprin,'6  Gorin, 5  Marylanders,'6 Holloway v.
Hechler,167 Montiel,'6s and Rodriguez69 all said that the sub-ten percent
plans were prima facie constitutional, even though they were all look-
ing at redistricting maps with significantly larger deviations than the
Vigo County plan, and most of them were clearly drawn in an effort
to stay within the ten percent window rather than to achieve a devia-
tion of zero. Even the courts in Hulme v. Madison County and Larios v.
Cox, discussed below, which struck down sub-ten percent plans, still
acknowledged that plans with deviations under ten percent do enjoy
presumptive validity." The Vigo court's only citation accompanying its
assertion that a sub-ten percent deviation could still be prima facie
unconstitutional was a page from Brown."' However, Brown said no
160 Id. (citing IND. CODE § 36-2-3-4 (1993)).
161 Id.
162 In all of the one person, one vote challenges to state and local redistricting plans that
have come since Vigo, only one-Rodriguez--has even cited the case, and the Rodriguez court did
so only to distinguish it. See Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (per
curiam) (noting that Vigo "arose under idiosyncratic facts").
163 274 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
1r 796 F. Supp. 662 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
165 788 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Wyo. 1992).
166 849 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Md. 1994).
167 817 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. W. Va. 1992) (granting a motion to dismiss a case challenging the
constitutionality of West Virginia's reapportionment statutes).
168 215 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
1 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
170 See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1340-41 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (noting that state legisla-
tive plans with population deviations of less than ten percent are presumptively constitutional
but not immune to constitutional attack); Hulme v. Madison County, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041,
1047 (S.D. Ill. 2001) ("It is... clear that a total population deviation of less than 10% enjoys a
presumption of validity and will not, by itself, support a claim of invidious discrimination.").
171 Vigo County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Vigo County Comm'rs, 834 F. Supp. 1080, 1085
(S.D. Ind. 1993) (citing Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983)).
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such thing; it said precisely the opposite, quoting Gaffney's statement
that plans with "minor deviations" of less than ten percent "are insuf-
ficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the
State.' ' 72 Neither Brown nor Gaffney created an exception to this rule
for sub-ten percent plans whose deviations were created in bad faith;
rather, they suggested that the very fact that a total deviation is less
than ten percent creates the presumption of good faith.
The court in Rodriguez distinguished the use of a ten percent
"population window" in Vigo from its similar use in New York, saying
that merely trying to stay below ten-percent deviation could not be
considered a failure to make a good faith effort to achieve population
equality. According to the Rodriguez court,
Vigo arose under idiosyncratic facts, where the plan's total deviation when
the litigation started was 37%; only to avoid losing in court did the plan-
ners consciously try to eliminate pre-existing bad faith by drawing a plan
within the ten-percent parameter. The Vigo court essentially found that
the defendants there did too little too late-a finding inapposite here.1
7 3
Rodriguez never fully explicated why the fact that there was a previous
plan with a thirty-seven percent deviation made the eventual, sub-ten
percent plan somehow worse than a plan always designed to stay just
under ten percent. Both plans evinced a determination to stay just
within the ten percent limit, with no apparent substantial effort to get
the deviation close to zero.
The second anomalous characteristic of the Vigo ruling was the
court's willingness to find that an alternative plan's lower deviation
was itself proof of a lack of a good faith effort to achieve maximum
equality.17  This willingness seems to fly in the face of Karcher, which
specifically warned against such minor second-guessing: "we [do not]
indicate that a plan cannot represent a good-faith effort whenever a
court can conceive of minor improvements.' 7 5  The fact that the
Karcher Court made this statement in evaluating a congressional plan
rather than a state or local plan-which have more leeway in popula-
tion deviations--only makes it more puzzling that the Vigo court did• • 176
not heed its caution.
172 Brown, 462 U.S. at 842 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973)).
173 Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (citation omitted).
174 See Vigo, 834 F. Supp. at 1086 (finding that redistricting just until the population deviation
is less than ten percent, even though it is possible to achieve districts with significantly lower
population deviation, is not a good faith effort to make the population as equal as possible).
175 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 n.10 (1983).
176 See also Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (citing this passage in
Karcher in explaining why a congressional apportionment map with a total deviation of seventy-
two persons was permissible even though "a 'better' plan might have been possible").
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Only two other federal courts-both coming after the post-2000
Census reapportionments-have struck down redistricting maps con-
taining "minor deviations."'77  Both cases, however, had anomalous
characteristics that call into question whether the Supreme Court's
approval of their results actually means that the Court is willing to
apply tough standards to redistricting maps with deviations under ten
percent. The first is the Southern District of Illinois's decision in
Hulme v. Madison County,11 which struck down Madison County's dis-
trict reapportionment plan that had a maximum population devia-
tion of 9.3%. 179 The court found that "the 2001 apportionment proc-
ess of the Madison County Board was unquestionably tainted with
arbitrariness and discrimination." 80  The court denied that "an ap-
portionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10%
is immune from Constitutional attack," instead saying that "a total
population deviation of less than 10% enjoys a presumption of valid-
ity and will not, by itself, support a claim of invidious discrimina-
tion." 8' But the court said that the burden shifts back to the defen-
dant to show a rational government policy if the plaintiffs can show
that the motives behind the deviations are illegitimate: "a plaintiff
may prove a prima facie violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by
an apportionment plan with a population deviation of less than 10%
if he can 'produce further evidence to show that the apportionment
process had a "taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. .....
The Hulme court found that the taint in the Madison County plan
was palpable. Specifically, the court found this arbitrariness and dis-
crimination in the fact that "[t] he apportionment process pursued in
Madison County throughout the first half of 2001 was designed spe-
177 There is one recent case that lies somewhere in between striking down a plan and uphold-
ing it. In Corbett v. Sullivan, 202 F. Supp. 2d 972 (E.D. Mo. 2002), the Eastern District of Mis-
souri was essentially asked to choose among several competing plans for the voting district lines
for the St. Louis County Council. The normal legislative process for creating a reapportion-
ment plan failed to produce a new plan. This was necessary because all parties agreed that
population changes documented in the 2000 Census revealed that the district lines then in
place clearly violated the principle of one person, one vote, with a total population deviation of
more than thirty percent. Id. at 976. With the normal political process mired in gridlock, the
matter was brought into federal court, with three parties-consisting of local Democrats, local
Republicans, and the NAACP--each asking the court to choose its proposed plan. Id. at 973.
The court rejected all the proposed plans, saying that they were all overly influenced by bla-
tantly partisan considerations. Id. at 988. Instead, the court drew up its own plan, taking into
account only the considerations of "[population] equality, contiguity, compactness, and racial
fairness." Id. at 989.
178 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Il. 2001).
179 Id. at 1055-56.
18I Id. at 1051.
181 Id. at 1047 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973)).
182 Id. (quoting Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1220 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964))).
Apr. 2005]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
cifically to satisfy the political agenda of Wayne Bridgewater, the
Chairman of the Legislative Committee."083 This might have been
more permissible had Mr. Bridgewater's behavior during the reap-
portionment process not bordered on the sociopathic. Mr. Bridge-
water was less than civil in his dealings with his colleagues-for ex-
ample, in discussing the apportionment plan with a Republican, he
stated that "[w]e are going to shove [the map] up your f-g ass and
you are going to like it, and I'll f- any Republican I can."' To an-
other County Board member, he said, "I hear you're saying bad
things about me, mother f-r. I'll tell you right now mother f-r, if
you open your mother f-g mouth, I'm gonna have your mother f-g
a- moved out by the mother f-g police." 185
The court found that the redistricting plan produced by this
process was illegitimate, and gave the following reasons for this find-
ing:
[Bridgewater's] primary objective was to construct a map with a popula-
tion deviation within the "target" of less than 10%, regardless of the prac-
ticality of reaching a lower percentage of population deviation....
Bridgewater's coincidental goal was to create districts that would not
simply disadvantage Republican members of the Board, but "cannibalize"
their districts to the greatest extent possible.... Bridgewater achieved his
goal, in large part, through his threatening and coercive actions against
other Board members. His behavior was not only boorish, but it clearly
demonstrates the bad faith under which the Madison County Board dis-
tricts were apportioned. Had he not pursued this agenda, or had the ma-
jority of the Board not acquiesced in this reapportionment plan, the state
of technology readily available to the Board would have allowed it, with
great practicability, to come much closer to an equal population in each
district. The apportionment process described above, therefore, demon-
strates a complete disregard for the Constitutional mandate that a legisla-
tive body make "an honest and good faith effort to construct dis-
tricts... as nearly of equal population as practicable."
186
The court therefore held that the "plaintiffs have established a prima
facie case of discrimination," and that, therefore, "defendants must
justify the population disparity."18 7 It concluded that it would have to
"decide whether the 'plan may reasonably be said to advance the ra-
tional state policy' advanced by the defendants. In this case, however,
183 Id. at 1051.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1050-51; see also Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117
HARv. L. REV. 1196, 1196 (2004) (quoting Bridgewater's less-than-civil language and noting that
"this is not how the distinguished Vice President of the United States and Governor of Massa-
chusetts [Elbridge Gerry, namesake of the term 'gerrymandering'] wanted to be remem-
bered").
186 Hulme, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1051-52 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964)).
187 Id. at 1052.
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defendants have not offered any state (governmental) policy to justify
the plan's population disparity."18
In essence, the Hulme court stated that the county plan was tainted
with blatant partisan political considerations, that no good faith effort
was expended to achieve equality in the size of districts, as opposed to
simply getting the deviation under ten percent, that the process of
creating the plan was characterized by excessive rudeness and intimi-
dation, and that no legitimate state policy was offered as justification
for the plan.
What Hulme did not make entirely clear was whether the problem
with the Madison County plan was the motivations or the process. Was
the electoral map impermissibly tainted because it was drawn for the
specific purpose of furthering the political goals of a party leader?
Or was the problem that said party leader intimidated his colleagues
using language straight out of a Martin Lawrence movie? If Bridge-
water had gotten the same plan passed, but did so without resorting
to Scarface-type threats, would it have been permissible? Or was the
map inherently tainted, no matter how civil his behavior, because the
population deviations were created to further partisan political goals
rather than some loftier public purpose? Though the court suggests
that the problem was simply that the plan was the product of Bridge-
water's partisan ambitions, the opinion's exhaustive detailing of his
obnoxious behavior implies that this behavior informed the result.8 9
Larios v. Cox1 90 is the most recent case in which a federal court
struck down a redistricting plan with a deviation under ten percent.
A threejudge court19' struck down the redistricting maps of the
Georgia state Senate and House of Representatives, each of which
188 Id. (quoting Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 843 (1983)).
189 The Cecere court acknowledged and did not criticize the result in Hulme. Rather, the court
distinguished Hulme not only for having been passed through the boorish bullying of the party
boss, but also for the very fact that it was not "the work product of one person but rather of the
Democratic majority of the Nassau County Legislature." Cecere v. County of Nassau, 274 F.
Supp. 2d 308, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). This distinction fails on both prongs. First, the Cecere court
acknowledged that there were "allegations in the complaint that defendants were rude to Re-
publican legislators and gave short shrift, if any consideration to their proposals." Id. Though
these allegations may have been less egregious than that exhibited by Mr. Bridgewater, in
Hulme, the court offered no metric for determining the level of partisan obnoxiousness neces-
sary to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation in redistricting (or an explanation of why
the alleged rudeness to the Nassau County Republicans failed to reach this standard). Second,
the plan at issue in Hulme was passed by a legislative majority, in a 21-7 vote by the Madison
County Board. Hulme, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. Although Mr. Bridgewater apparently exerted
much personal and political pressure over the committee that recommended the plan to the
full board, there were no allegations that he attempted to physically intimidate the majority of
the board who passed the plan.
190 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (per curiam).
191 At the time of the Larios decision, I was a clerk to Judge Marcus, the designated Circuit
Judge on the panel.
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had a maximum population deviation of 9.98%. 9' Half of the 180
seats in the House plan were in districts that were over or underpopu-
lated by at least four percent, twenty of them by at least 4.9%. 9 In
the Senate, thirty-seven of the fifty-six districts had deviations greater
than four percent, sixteen of which had deviations greater than
4.9%. 194 The court struck down the House and Senate plans, but ex-
plicitly disavowed the proposition that its decision was based on a
finding that partisan motives, in and of themselves, are impermissible
reasons for population deviations: "it is unnecessary in this case to
decide whether partisan advantage alone would have been enough to
justify minor population deviations, although the Supreme Court has
never sanctioned partisan advantage as a legitimate justification for
population deviations." 95 Rather, the court hinged its decision on a
holding that two other primary motivations-regional favoritism and
Democratic incumbency protection-were impermissible causes for
the deviations. 96 The Court struck down the plans and, when the
state government was unable to pass new plans, appointed a special
master to do so.
The Georgia plans were the product of an effort by state Democ-
rats to maintain majorities in the state House and Senate despite a
Republican majority in the state that had been developing for the
past few decades. The 2000 Census revealed that in the previous ten
years, the population growth of the predominantly Republican sub-
urban areas surrounding Atlanta had significantly outpaced that of
rural southern Georgia and inner-city Atlanta, which tended to be
Democratic. 97 This meant that reapportionment would require cre-
ating new seats in the Republican parts of the state, and correspond-
ingly taking them away from the Democratic parts. In an effort to
stem this tide and allow rural southern Georgia and inner-city At-
lanta-and their respective incumbent Democratic officeholders-to
hold on to as many seats as possible, the drafters of the reapportion-
ment plans systematically and deliberately Iunderpopulated the bulk
of the districts in rural and inner-city areas.
The Georgia plans were also designed to help ensure the electoral
safety of Democratic incumbents. The districts in which Democratic
officeholders lived were underpopulated so that they need not take
on any more new-possibly electorally hostile-constituents than
192 Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
193 Id. at 1326.
194 Id. at 1327.
195 Id. at 1351.
19 Id. at 1322.
197 Id. at 1323.
198 Id. at 1326-27.
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necessary. 9 By contrast, the court found, dozens of Republican in-
cumbents were paired with one another in creatively drawn districts
in an effort to "unseat as many of them as possible., 200 Fully half the
House Republicans were placed in new districts in which at least one
other incumbent lived.20 1 Many of these incumbent-pairing districts
were very oddly shaped and overpopulated, making plain that the
pairings were deliberate rather than just incidental to other, politi-
cally benign redistricting policies.
20 2
The court found that regional bias and Democratic incumbency
protection were major, and impermissible, motivations behind the
population deviations in the Georgia plans.0 3 With respect to the
former, the court said that "the Supreme Court has long and repeat-
edly held that favoring certain geographic regions of a state over
other regions is unconstitutional. 2 4  The court quoted Reynolds v.
Sims: "The fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legiti-
mate reason for over-weighting or diluting the efficacy of his
vote.... A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because
he lives in the city or on the farm."2 5 Moreover, the court said that
the Supreme Court "has never retreated from the firm command in
Reynolds that '[d] iluting the weight of votes because of place of resi-
dence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon
factors such as race or economic status. ,206 The court concluded that
if the southern and inner-city Atlanta areas of the State of Georgia are in
need of some political protection in order to ensure that their economic
and other interests are recognized on a statewide basis, that need must be
met in some way that does not dilute or debase the fundamental right to
207
vote of citizens living in other parts of the state.
As for the protection of Democratic incumbents, the court ac-
knowledged that although incumbency protection is a legitimate goal
of traditional redistricting that can potentially justify minor popula-
tion deviations, the one-sided partisan manner in which the Georgia
plan protected incumbents did not pass constitutional muster under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 8 This was because the policy of in-
1 See id. at 1329 (finding that there had been "an intentional effort to allow incumbent De-
mocrats to maintain or increase their delegation, primarily by systematically underpopulating
the districts held by incumbent Democrats").
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1330.
203 Id. at 1322.
Mo" Id. at 1342.
205 Id. at 1342-43 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964)).
W6 Id. at 1344 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566).
207 Id. at 1347.
208 Id. at 1349.
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cumbent protection in the plans was not consistently applied.2°9
Rather, the plans helped only Democrats while aggressively and de-
liberately pursuing the exact opposite goal against Republican in-
cumbents by pairing dozens of them in the same districts. 0 Karcher v.
Daggett held that certain "consistently applied" redistricting criteria,
including "avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives,"
could justify minor population deviations."' But because the incum-
bent protection in the Georgia plans was the virtual opposite of a
consistently applied policy-it protected only Democratic incum-
bents-it was not a proper justification for the population deviations
in the plans.2
The contrast between the regionalism argument as presented in
Larios, and the same one presented in Rodriguez v. Pataki,21s decided
just two months later, is striking. In Larios, the state defended itself by
arguing that the population deviations were motivated not by parti-
san considerations but rather by regional concerns. 4 The court did
not accept this argument, saying that regionalism is no more a legiti-
mate policy than is partisan gain.21 5 In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs brought
Id. at 1347.
210 See id. ("[The policy] was applied in a blatantly partisan and discriminatory manner, tak-
ing pains to protect only Democratic incumbents.").
2 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
212 Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1349. The court also found that the incumbency protection in
the Georgia plans was problematic because it went beyond merely avoiding incumbent pairings,
but actually created population deviations to make incumbents' seats safer even when there was
no danger of pairing. Id. at 1348-49. The court said that this had never been a traditionally
accepted redistricting criterion that justified population deviations, and found that
many of the incumbent-protecting population deviations were caused not by the legiti-
mate state interest in avoiding contests between incumbents, but, rather by the more ag-
gressive goal of allowing incumbents to avoid taking on more new constituents than was
absolutely necessary to stay within 5% of the ideal district size.
Id. at 1349.
213 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (per curiam).
24 See 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 ("[T]he principal drafter of the House Plan, unambiguously
said that an effort to allow rural south Georgia to keep as many seats as possible was a basic
cause of the population deviations in the House.") Part of the reason why the state denied that
partisan politics played a part in the deviations may have been that the Georgia plans had also
been challenged as an unconstitutional political gerrymander, a challenge that had been ter-
minated at summary judgment. Id. at 1322.
215 Id. at 1342. The Wyoming court in Gorin v. Karpan, 788 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Wyo. 1992),
although it upheld the Wyoming reapportionment plans against one person, one vote chal-
lenge, seemed to be similarly suspicious of regional bias in redistricting. The court wrote:
What the legislature may not do, however, is elevate that pursuit above the pursuit of sub-
stantial equality among individual voters. Reapportionment according to regional inter-
ests, if achieved at the expense of significant intrusion upon individual voting rights, is
intolerable. Counties do not stand on equal constitutional ground with citizens at the
ballot box.
Id. at 1201 (quoting Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1446 (D. Wyo. 1991)). The court
nonetheless upheld the plan because it believed the Wyoming Legislature had made a consci-
entious effort to improve the equality of the districts. Id.
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the regionalism charge, and the court did not accept it, in part be-
cause the court believed that "regionalism" was merely a proxy for
partisan considerations and was therefore permissible. Put simply,
the state in Larios believed that regionalism is a legitimate defense
against charges of partisan bias, while Rodriguez held that partisan bias
is a legitimate defense against regionalism. These. competing inter-
pretations of one person, one vote law reveal just how confusing the
law in this area can be.
On appeal, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Larios de-
cision without oral argument. 216 The only member of the Court to
dissent from the Court's summary affirmance was Justice Scalia, who
argued that Vieth v. Jubelirer called the correctness of the ruling into
question "A substantial case can be made," Justice Scalia wrote,
"that Georgia's redistricting plan did comply with the Constitution.
Appellees do not contend that the population deviations-all less
than five percent from the mean-were based on race or some other
suspect classification. 2 1 9 The problem with the Georgia court's analy-
sis, according to Justice Scalia, "is that it assumes 'politics as usual' is
not itself a 'traditional' redistricting criterion."220  The Larios stan-
dard, if followed elsewhere, would "invite allegations of political mo-
tivation whenever there is population disparity, and thus . . . destroy
the 10% safe harbor our cases provide.
2 2 1
Justice Scalia's dissent seems to misread the lower court's actual
holding. The court took pains to explain that it was striking down
the Georgia plans because the population deviations were the prod-
uct of two plainly illegitimate purposes: the regional preference of
rural and inner-city areas over suburbs and exurbs, and the inconsis-
tent protection of Democratic (but not Republican) incumbents
against pairing. The court specifically said that it was not ruling on
whether pure partisanship-in Justice Scalia's terms, "politics as
usual"-was a permissible cause of the deviations.2
216 Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2806 (2004).
217 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
218 Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2809 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219 Id.
' Id.
21 Id. at 2810. Justice Stevens, joined by justice Breyer, concurred with the Court's summary
affirmance. Id. at 2806 (Stevens, J., concurring). The primary purpose of the concurrence
seems to have been to note that "had the Court in Vieth adopted a standard for adjudicating
partisan gerrymandering claims, the standard likely would have been satisfied in this case" be-
cause the partisan gerrymandering in the Georgia plans was so egregious. Id. at 2808.
2 Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (per curiam). In a recent arti-
cle, Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan argue that the Supreme Court's Cox v. Larios deci-
sion allowed for "second-order" adjudication of political gerrymandering claims, even while the
Court had recently foreclosed on "first-order" adjudications in Vieth. Samuel Issacharoff &
Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L.
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C. The Political Effects of Allowing Population Deviations
In the years since the establishment of the ten percent rule, draft-
ers of state and local redistricting plans have interpreted ten percent
as the maximum deviation they can create without running into con-
stitutional problems. Believing that the Supreme Court has essen-
tially given them carte blanche to create reapportionment maps with
population deviations up to ten percent, plan drafters have consis-
tently pushed the ten percent rule to the limit. According to data
from the National Conference of State Legislatures, the majority of
state houses now have total population deviations very close to ten
percent. 22  Out of ninety-nine state legislatures,22 4 fifty-eight have de-
viations of at least nine percent.25 Twenty are between 9.9 and ex-
actly 10 percent. 6
Although minor deviations might not make much political differ-
ence in state legislatures in which one party enjoys heavy majorities,
they can have a dispositive impact on control over closely divided
state houses. For example, the 2002 elections in Georgia-which
took place under a reapportionment plan with population deviations
totaling 9.98% in each state House-resulted in a 30-26 Democratic
REV. 541, 567 (2004). According to the authors, Vieth made it extremely hard to get a reappor-
tionment plan struck down solely because it blatandy favors one party over another; but Cox
'restores an opportunity for second-order judicial review of political gerrymanders: if a plan
contains any population deviations, a court may decide that the deviations are caused by im-
permissible partisanship and strike the plan down as a formal matter for failure to comply with
one person, one vote." Id. This analysis may be literally accurate, but Issacharoff and Karlan
appear to underestimate the qualitatively different harm suffered in cases like Larios, where in-
dividual citizens' votes are plainly and concretely underweighed compared with other voters'.
The Larios court in Georgia said that it struck down the plans because population deviations in
reapportionment plans require a legitimate justification, and the regionalism and favoring of
Democratic incumbents in the Georgia plans did not meet this standard. Larios, 300 F. Supp.
2d at 1322. Such challenges are not just a backdoor route to challenging partisan gerryman-
ders, but rather address a separate and more clearly cognizable constitutional harm.
M National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting 2000 Population Deviation Table, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/redistrict/redistpopdev.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2005).
24 Of the fifty states, Nebraska has the only unicameral state legislature. Id. The Nebraska
Legislature is also the only state house whose membership is non-partisan; since 1934, Nebraska
senators have not officially affiliated with political parties. See Nebraska Legislature, The History
of Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature, at http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/learning/history.htm (last
visited Feb. 19, 2005).
25 National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 223. This number does not include
the two Georgia Houses, which both had deviations totaling 9.98% in their post-2000 reappor-
tionment but which the Larios court ordered redrawn. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1352-53.
Of the fifty-eight, six state houses have deviations greater than ten percent, led by the Hawaii
state senate, with a deviation of 38.9%. Nebraska Legislature, supra note 224.
M National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 223. The North Dakota state legisla-
ture wins the prize for most aggressive pushing of the ten percent rule, as both its House and
Senate round out to exactly ten percent. Id.
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. 227majority. In the Montana House, which has a population deviation
totaling 9.85%, 22 Republicans enjoy a 53-47 majority. The GOP also
holds a 61-59 majority in the North Carolina House, which has a de-
viation of 9.98%, while the Democrats hold on to a 27-23 majority in
the North Carolina Senate, with its deviation of 9.96%.229 Their De-
mocratic neighbors to the south hold a 25-21 majority in the South
Carolina Senate, thanks in part to a 9.87% deviation there..2 " And in
the Vermont House, with its deviation of 18.99%, Republicans hold a
73-71 edge over the Democrats.' In any of these state houses, it is
easy to see how even slight population deviations-especially when
created in a deliberately partisan manner--can make the difference
between Democratic and Republican control. As John Hart Ely
wrote,
given the capabilities of computers, a green light for partisan gerryman-
dering can easily undo the good that the Warren Court thought (cor-
rectly in those pre-computer days) its reapportionment decisions would
accomplish. Give a latter-day Elbridge Gerry or Boss Tweed a modern
computer, and one person/one vote will seem a minor annoyance.
232
D. Inevitable Politics?
Many of the courts that have upheld redistricting plans have
commented not only on the fact that redistricting had traditionally
been the province of legislators rather than courts, but also that poli-
tics is inevitable in redistricting and legal barriers to politics in redis-• 2 3 3
tricting are doomed to failure. They often cite the statement in
27 The Republicans eventually gained the majority in the State Senate when four of the Sen-
ate's Democrats switched parties, making it a 30-26 Republican majority. Larios, 300 F. Supp.
2d at 1327.M National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 223.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Ely, supra note 3, at 505.
232 See, e.g., Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Even if electoral equality were
the paramount concern of the one person, one vote principle, the district court's approach in
this action would lead federal courts too far into the 'political thicket.'" (internal citations omit-
ted)); Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (per curiam) ("lP]olitics
surely played a role in redistricting in New York in 2002-as it does in most every jurisdiction.");
Cecere v. County of Nassau, 274 F. Supp. 2d 308, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("That the challenger
bears the burden of proof when the deviation rate is under ten percent is largely irrelevant to
the concern expressed in Gaffney that federal courts not be drawn into the political and legisla-
tive redistricting thicket in scenarios involving 'minor deviations from mathematical equality
among state legislative districts.'") (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973));
Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1043 (D. Md. 1994)
(three-judge court) ("Bandemer requires that Republicans have no voice in the political process,
which, as demonstrated by MFR's own witnesses, they clearly do. When, to what extent, and on
which issues they are listened to are questions that are quite properly resolved by the political
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Gaffney v. Cummings that "[p]olitics and political considerations are
inseparable from districting and apportionment" and that "districting
inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political conse-
quences 2 34 in support of this proposition, although, as discussed
above, the Gaffney opinion addressed an almost too-fair reapportion-
ment plan that differed almost diametrically from the plans that are
commonly challenged in federal court. Even more importantly, these
statements in the Gaffney opinion were made not in the context of a
one person, one vote discussion, but rather in the section of the opin-
ion focusing on political gerrymandering.23 5 Thus, Gaffney's admonition
about the inevitability of politics in redistricting is less a form of per-
mission for politically motivated population deviations than it is a
precursor of the broad latitude given to political gerrymanders in
Davis v. Bandemer and Vieth, both of which cite this language. 36
Making a constitutional argument that the inevitability of politics in
redistricting means that courts should just stay out of the redistricting
business runs up against the fact that the Supreme Court has stepped
in, or allowed lower courts to step in, when the political process has
crossed some line. The Court struck down such plans in Reynolds v.
Sim 2 37 and Baker v. Car,238 the racial gerrymandering cases, and more
recently affirmed the Larios decision. And a majority of the Court
also recently demonstrated its willingness to accept a legal intrusion
into another area of election law tinged with constitutional questions:
campaign finance reform.239 One constant criticism of the McCain-
Feingold campaign finance law was that it was futile, because money
will inevitably find its way into the political system no matter what
regulations are enacted.2 4 The Court in McConnell v. FEC acknowl-
process, not by the courts."); Farnum v. Bums, 561 F. Supp. 83, 92 (D.R.I 1983) ("[T]he Court
is mindful of the fact that redistricting is a legislative activity in which courts are generally reluc-
tant to intervene.").
2G4 Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
235 See id. at 751-53 (defending the "political fairness principle" applied by the apportion-
ment board).
236 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1781 (2004) (stating that districting by political enti-
ties is not "root-and-branch" a matter of politics); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129 (1986)
("The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political conse-
quences.").
237 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires substantially
equal representation for all citizens in a state regardless of where they reside).
2S8 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that an equal protection challenge to an apportionment
statute presented ajusticiable constitutional cause of action).
239 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
240 Even supporters of the law made this concession. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne Jr., How the Money
Talks, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2001, at A27 ("Money always has a way of finding new tributaries
into politics. We know for certain that McCain-Feingold, all by itself, can't dam them all up.");
Paula Dwyer et al., Campaign Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 16, 2001,
at 42 ("'Inevitably,' sighs Senator Susan M. Collins, a Maine Republican and ardent reform
backer, 'we'll have to come back and figure out how to close all the new loopholes.'").
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edged this reality: "We are under no illusion that [the McCain-
Feingold law] will be the last congressional statement on the matter
[of campaign finance]. Money, like water, will always find an out-
let." '' But the Court nonetheless allowed most of the law to remain
in place, as striking it down would improperly hamper efforts to
combat (even if it can never completely eliminate) the corrupting in-
fluence of money in politics. The Court quoted Burroughs v. UnitedS 241
States, which declared that "[t]o say that Congress is without power
to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the
improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the na-
tion in a vital particular the power of self-protection. 2 43 And just as
the fact that money will always be in politics does not mean that ef-
forts to push back its influence are doomed to immediate and total
failure, the same can be said of politics and redistricting. Just be-
cause it would be futile to try to completely get rid of the impact of
partisan motives on redistricting does not mean that partisan motives
are always permissible no matter how far they are taken.
The Cecere v. County of Nassau court pointed out, quite rightly, that
partisan motivation in districting has been invoked as a defense against
racial gerrymandering claims.2  In Hunt v. Cromartie,2 the Court
stated that "a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political ger-
rymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats
happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of
that fact."246 In Bush v. Vera,247 the Court distinguished between ra-
cially based districting and political districting, suggesting that the lat-
ter is more permissible: "If district lines merely correlate with race
because they are drawn on the basis of political affiliation, which cor-
relates with race, there is no racial classification to justify. ,,4 In
Shaw v. Reno,249 the Court stated that "redistricting differs from other
kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of
race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic
status, religious and 2 olitical persuasion, and a variety of other
demographic factors."
241 McConnel 540 U.S. at 224.
242 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
243 Id. at 545.
244 See 274 F. Supp. 2d 308, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]he Supreme Court has recognized po-
litical motivation as a possible defense against a claim of racial gerrymandering.").
245 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
246 Id. at 551.
247 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
248 Id. at 968.
249 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
250 Id. at 646.
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However, pointing out that partisan motivations are used as a de-
fense against charges of racial gerrymandering does not prove that
partisan motivations are always permissible in redistricting. Although
Davis v. Bandemer251 and the Vieth v. Jubelirer52 majority set a very high
standard for demonstrating an Equal Protection Clause violation in
partisan gerrymandering, they did set a standard. They did not say
that partisan motivations are always permissible, no matter how far
they are taken. Additionally, one person, one vote deviations based
on race, as discussed above, are held to higher scrutiny than are racial
gerrymanders. Thus, it is simply false to say that Gaffney allows no
limit to partisan motivations in redistricting. And even if it did, Ban-
demer and Vieth did place limits (albeit very high ones) on partisan re-
districting.
We still must answer the most basic question in this area of the law
that no Supreme Court decision has squarely addressed: is it consti-
tutional to create deviations from one person, one vote equality for
the purpose of advancing partisan goals, and if not, then how far may
such efforts go? In light of Gaffney, it would seem unrealistic to ex-
pect that politics cannot have even a de minimis impact on deviations,
when that case-a one person, one vote case, albeit a strange one-
stated that politics is an inevitable part of redistricting. But at the
same time, it seems equally farfetched that politics can always be used
to push the deviation up to the ten percent limit. Doing so would ef-
fectively make ten percent a safe harbor in which deviations could be
caused by any motive (except maybe race or ethnicity).
Karcher put forth a list of acceptable reasons for minor population
deviations-"making districts compact, respecting municipal bounda-
ries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests be-
tween incumbent Representatives"-but stated that they were only
253examples. The Court stated that other policies are also acceptable
reasons for deviations, "[a]s long as the criteria are nondiscrimina-
tory.''254 Is a policy aimed at helping one political party at the expense
of another an example of a discriminatory criterion?
One answer may be found in Bandemer. As easy to surmount as it
was, the legal standard set forth in that case explicitly stated that it is
possible for purely partisan acts in redistricting to constitute uncon-
stitutional "discrimination": "[U] nconstitutional discrimination oc-
curs.., when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the
251 478 U.S. 109 (1986)
252 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
253 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
254 - .
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political process as a whole."255 In other words, a redistricting plan
can be "discriminatory" for Equal Protection Clause purposes even if
the group it victimized is classified not by race, ethnicity, or other
such suspect class but by political affiliation. And as discussed above,
the standard for partisan one person, one vote challenges should be
stricter than for partisan gerrymanders in the same sense (and to the
same extent) that one person, one vote cases based on race have a
higher standard than racial gerrymandering ones.
Furthermore, the very language used in Bandemer to describe the
kind of effect that would be necessary to find unconstitutional dis-
crimination works much better for one person, one vote claims than
for gerrymandering claims.256 Someone whose vote counts less than
those of others because he lives in a district with an unusually large
number of voters will, by definition, have his vote "degraded." This
degradation is more direct than those that result from gerrymander-
ing, as it renders some votes and some voters literally less important
the others. Voters in high-population districts are hurt not just in the
sense that they are shoehorned into districts guaranteed to elect rep-
resentatives they don't like. Rather, one person, one vote deviations
"degrade" in the sense that Webster's Dictionary defines the word: "to
lower from a superior to an inferior level. 2 5 1 Unlike in cases of ger-
rymandering, one person, one vote "degradation" to a person's vot-
ing power will remain as long as he lives in that district (unless its
population drops). In any event, the various opinions and dissents in
Vieth, discussed below, offered several other means of determining
redressable harm in partisan gerrymandering cases.
Perhaps the most useful standard to use in assessing one person,
one vote deviations is to consider Roman v. Sincocks's determination of
whether "there has been a faithful adherence to a plan of population-
based representation, with such minor deviations only as may occur
in recognizing certain factors that are free from any taint of arbitrari-
ness or discrimination." 25 Roman is saying that even the minor devia-
tions must be free of arbitrariness and discrimination. Is the desire
for a partisan goal an example of an arbitrary or discriminatory goal
in redistricting? It obviously is not arbitrary-indeed, it is quite de-
liberate and rational-but, as discussed above, it is quite possibly dis-
criminatory for Equal Protection Clause purposes. But what does
Roman mean by "tainted"? Webster's Dictionary gives a number of defi-
nitions of the word "tainted," two of which are relevant here: (1) "to
touch or affect slightly with something bad or undesirable;" or (2) "to
255 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132.
256 Id.
257 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 594 (1993).
2-s 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
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contaminate morally." 59 Determining which definition Chief Justice
Warren was thinking of in writing Roman could have a substantial im-
pact on the treatment of partisan gain in redistricting. The first defi-
nition requires only a small effect for something to be "tainted," while
the latter requires serious moral decay.
It is unclear whether Chief Justice Warren was admonishing us
against even the slightest hint of bad faith and nefariousness, or was
concerned only about substantial transgressions. If it was the former,
ChiefJustice Warren might have been more likely to have used some-
thing like the phrase "free from any hint of arbitrariness or discrimi-
nation" rather than "free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimina-
tion.,,26  The practical impact of this reading of Roman is that it
effectively holds that even if partisan gain is an illegitimate motive for
even minor deviations from perfect district equality, its contribution
to the deviation has to be substantial for it to be held to violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
II. FORMULATING A STANDARD FOR POLITICAL
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE CHALLENGES
As discussed above, so-called "minor deviations" in state and local
districting plans matter. Indeed, the very fact that map drafters in so
many states create plans with population deviations so close to ten
percent indicates that they are well aware of the potential political
benefits of such disparities. The Supreme Court's 8-1 summary af-
firmation of Larios v. Cox 61 indicates a recognition that apportion-
ment plans with population deviations under ten percent must still be
justified by some legitimate state policy. And the case law suggests
that naked partisan advantage is not such a motive, at least when it is
divorced from any other justification.
Reading together the varying rules and principles laid out in Rey-
nolds,2 62 Brown, 6 Roman,26 4 Karcher,26 5 Davis v. Bandemer,66 and other
relevant cases makes it possible to come up with a standard for evalu-
ating the propriety of partisan motives in redistricting plans that have
minor deviations in population between districts. In many states, the
districting plans are close enough to a ten percent deviation that it
seems obvious that ten percent, rather than Reynolds's goal of perfect
259 WEBSTER'S, supra note 257, at 2329.
260 Roman, 377 U.S. at 710.
261 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff'd 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004).
262 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
263 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
264 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
265 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
266 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
1044 [Vol. 7:4
equality, was the true objective.267 In other words, the planners were
trying to make the plan as unequal as they could get away with.
Nonetheless, with deviations of less than ten percent, the burden is
on the plaintiffs to prove.., well, what exactly? This Part tries to an-
swer that question, offering a constitutional standard for political one
person, one vote cases that is both a prediction of what the Court
might do, and a modest proposal for what it should do.
The case law reveals that there should be some standard for deter-
mining whether partisan manipulation of district populations violates
the Equal Protection Clause. Is partisan advantage such a poisonous
motive that it cannot be responsible for the tiniest fraction of any
population deviation? Or is "politics as usual" such a generally per-
missible motive in reapportionment that it should only be seen as
suspect in the most egregious cases of abuse, as is the case for politi-
cal gerrymanders? Or is there some proper standard in between?
Section A addresses this issue and argues that, based on existing case
law, the most logical standard to apply is a form of the "predomi-
nance" standard that has been established for racial gerrymandering
challenges.
And, apart from the degree to which politics may influence district
population sizes without running into constitutional problems, how
does a plaintiff go about proving that a violation has occurred? Is it
through a mathematical analysis showing how much smaller the de-
viations could have been had politics not influenced the map draw-
ing, as the court in Vigo County Republican Central Committee v. Vigo
County Commissioners suggested? Or is it through testimonial and
documentary evidence of the role politics played in the reapportion-
ment process, which was the route the Hulme v. Madison County
269
court took? Section B suggests that a balance of both of these meth-
ods is proper.
A. How Much Can Politics Influence Population Deviations?
If partisan motivations are not always a constitutional justification
for one person, one vote deviations, then what is the standard to ap-
ply to them? This Section proposes that the question can be an-
swered by looking at the constitutional standards applied in three
other areas of reapportionment law where there is established Su-
preme Court case law, and extrapolating from them to figure out
267 See supra text accompanying notes 223-25 (citing recent data from the National Confer-
ence of State Legislators that reveal that a majority of state houses have population deviations
close to ten percent).
2 834 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
269 188 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. W. Va. 1992).
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where the political one person, one vote doctrine fits along the spec-
trum of standards. The three other areas of law are political gerry-.
mandering, racial gerrymandering, and racial one person, one vote
cases.
1. The Political Genymandering Standard
The easiest feasible standard to use for partisan one person, one
vote deviations is the standard set for partisan gerrymandering in
Vieth v. Jubelirer'0 and Davis v. Bandemer.2  Constitutionally speaking,
gerrymandering is the closest cousin to one person, one vote viola-
tions, as they both involve the manipulation of voting districts toward
a political end, and come under equal protection scrutiny as a result.
If that standard is applied, then virtually every plaintiff challenging
sub-ten percent deviations from perfect population equality will
surely lose-as they would lose on their political gerrymandering
claim-because they would have to "prove both intentional discrimi-
nation against an identifiable political group and an actual discrimi-natory effect on that group, such that the plaintiffs have "essen-
tially been shut out of the political process. Since Bandemer, no
plaintiff has ever won an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a par-
tisan gerrymander.
A sharply divided Supreme Court recently set out its thinking on
partisan gerrymandering in Vieth, a challenge to Pennsylvania's new
congressional districting map.274 Justice Scalia, writing for a four-
judge plurality consisting of himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tices O'Connor and Thomas, declared that partisan gerrymandering
claims are nonjusticiable and that therefore no possible gerrymander,
no matter how extreme, can be the basis for a challenge. The opin-
ion criticized the Bandemer plurality's holding, stating that it was "not.. 
. . 275
persuaded" that partisan gerrymanders are nonjustciable. Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, the need to cobble together a six-judge majority
in Bandemer led to an unsustainable result: "The clumsy shifting of
the burden of proof for the premise (the Court was 'not persuaded'
that standards do not exist, rather than 'persuaded' that they do) was
necessitated by the uncomfortable fact that the six-Justice majority
could not discern what the judicially discernable standards might
270 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
27 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
27 Id. at 127.
27 Id. at 139.
24 For comprehensive analyses of Vieth, see Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the
Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626 (2004); Issacharoff
& Karlan, supra note 222, at 554-64.
25 124 S. Ct. at 1777 (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123).
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be."27 6 As such, according to Justice Scalia, Bandemer left it up to the
lower courts to establish the standard for evaluating challenges to
partisan gerrymanders, but, lacking guidance from the Supreme
Court, "the lower courts have, over 18 years, [not] succeeded in shap-
ing the standard that this Court was initially unable to enunciate."
Instead, the lower courts simply adopted the standard set forth by the
four-Justice Bandemer plurality: that for an electoral map to be un-
constitutional, it must not just discriminate against an identified po-
litical group and defy proportional representation, but must also be
"arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a
group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole," and
there must be "evidence of continued frustration of the will of a ma-
jority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair
chance to influence the political process.,
27 8
According to Justice Scalia's opinion in Vieth, in the eighteen years
since the Bandemer decision, the application of its plurality standard
"has almost invariably produced the same result (except for the in-
curring of attorney's fees) as would have obtained if the question
were nonjusticiable: judicial intervention has been refused., 279 Jus-
tice Scalia noted that the two standards put forth in Bandemer differed
from the three different separate standards proposed by the Vieth dis-
senters and concurrence and the one offered by the Vieth plaintiffs,
and stated that this very variance suggests that no constitutionally
mandated and workable standard exists.280  As such, Justice Scalia's
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132-33.
279 Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1777.
280 Id. at 1784; see also id. at 1797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing a standard for
evaluating partisan gerrymanders, discussed infra notes 282-96 and accompanying text); id. at
1810 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a cause of action can exist in partisan gerrymander
cases, but that partisanship can "be a permissible consideration in drawing district lines, so long
as it does not predominate"); id. at 1817-19 (Souter, J., dissenting) (proposing a five-part test
for proving a prima facie violation in a single-member district: (1) "the resident plaintiff would
identify a cohesive political group to which he belonged"; (2) that the plaintiffs district "paid
little or no heed to those traditional districting principles whose disregard can be shown
straightforwardly: contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and conformity
with geographic features like rivers and mountains"; (3) "specific correlations between the dis-
trict's deviations from traditional districting principles and the distribution of the population of
his group"; (4) "a plaintiff would need to present the court with a hypothetical district includ-
ing his residence, one in which the proportion of the plaintiffs group was lower (in a packing
claim) or higher (in a cracking one) and which at the same time deviated less from traditional
districting principles than the actual district"; and (5) "the plaintiff would have to show that the
defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the district in order to pack or crack
his group"). In his dissenting opinion,Justice Breyer observed:
At the same time, [certain constitutional and political] considerations can help identify
at least one circumstance where use of purely political boundary-drawing factors can
amount to a serious, and remediable, abuse, namely the unjustified use of political factors
to entrench a minority in power. By entrenchment I mean a situation in which a party
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plurality opinion concluded that "no judicially discernible and man-
ageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims
have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political gerry-
mandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was wrongly
decided.""
However, to get the fifth vote against overturning the Pennsyl-
vania plan, the four plurality justices were joined by Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, which rejected the plurality's categorical denial ofjusti-
ciability in gerrymandering challenges. Justice Kennedy refused to
condone a blanket denial of relief to even the most egregious politi-
cal gerrymanders, arguing optimistically that the fact "[t]hat no such
standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that
none will emerge in the future."282 First of all, according to Justice
Kennedy, allegations of discrimination in voting apportionment im-
plicate important constitutional rights, and therefore "the impossibil-
ity of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on the side of cau-
tion. 28 3 Second, Justice Kennedy argued, the lower courts' inability
to formulate a satisfying standard for partisan gerrymandering cases
in the past eighteen years was caused by the fact that they were bound
to follow Bandemer, which "formulated a single, apparently insuper-
able standard., 284 And finally, Justice Kennedy argued, eighteen years
was not really so long a time, because new technologies for reappor-
tionment constitute "both a threat and a promise"285:
On the one hand, if courts refuse to entertain any claims of partisan ger-
rymandering, the temptation to use partisan favoritism in districting in
an unconstitutional manner will grow. On the other hand, these new
that enjoys only minority support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to take,
and hold, legislative power. By unjustified entrenchment I mean that the minority's hold
on power is purely the result of partisan manipulation and not other factors. These
'other' factors that could lead to 'justified' (albeit temporary) minority entrenchment
include sheer happenstance, the existence of more than two major parties, the unique
constitutional requirements of certain representational bodies such as the Senate, or re-
liance on traditional (geographic, communities of interest, etc.) districting criteria.
Id. at 1825 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 1778 (plurality opinion).
282 Id. at 1795 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
28s Id. at 1796. Needless to say, this argument is a rather question-begging one, because it
assumes that political favoritism can constitute a constitutional violation, which is exactly what
Justice Scalia's opinion argued against.
In addition, the proposition that the courts' inability to formulate a workable standard for
partisan gerrymandering cases is a good reason to continue to hold out for the possibility that
such a standard will eventually be established is rather disingenuous, because it essentially
means that no result will ever convince Justice Kennedy that a workable standard is impossible.
According to this logic, the more difficult it is to create a good standard, the more reason to be
wary of abandoning such efforts. This seems counterintuitive, but it is exactly whatJustice Ken-
nedy appears to argue.
4 Id.
285 Id.
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technologies may produce new methods of analysis that make more evi-
dent the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose on the rep-
resentational rights of voters and parties. That would facilitate court ef-
forts to identify and remedy the burdens, with judicial intervention
limited by the derived standards.8 6
Justice Kennedy countered Justice Scalia's claim that he "re-
solve[s] this case with reference to no standard" by saying "that is
wrong. The Fourteenth Amendment standard governs; and there is
no doubt of that. 28 7 Applying this Fourteenth Amendment standard,
Justice Kennedy found that the Pennsylvania plan was permissible.
He found "no authority" for the "principle appellants propose, which
is that a majority of voters in the Commonwealth should be able to
elect a majority of the Commonwealth's congressional delegation."
28 8
He also rejected the proposition that district compactness and conti-
guity be used as criteria for determining whether a redistricting map
burdens Fourteenth Amendment rights, because "[t]hey cannot
promise political neutrality when used as the basis for relief. Instead,
it seems, a decision under these standards would unavoidably have
significant political effect, whether intended or not., 289 Despite his
claim that Justice Scalia was wrong to say that he applied no standard,
this seemed to be the end of Justice Kennedy's Fourteenth Amend-
ment analysis.
As for what a proper standard for partisan gerrymanders could be,
Justice Kennedy suggested that future challenges might hinge not on
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, but rather on First
Amendment speech and associational principles.290 Citing Elrod v.
Burns 91 and California Democratic Party v. Jones, 292 justice Kennedy said
that "First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts a law that
has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their
party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views., 293 As such, a
First Amendment cause of action may arise when a partisan gerry-
mander "has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters'
representational rights., 294 In such a case, the First Amendment stan-
dard would be to determine "whether the legislation burdens the
286 Id.
287 Id. at 1797.
288 Id. at 1793.
289 Id. at 1794.
290 See id. at 1797 ("If a court were to find that a State did impose burdens and restrictions on
groups or persons by reason of their views, there would likely be a First Amendment violation,
unless the State shows some compelling interest.").
291 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
292 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
29 124 S. Ct. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
294 Id.
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representational rights of the complaining party's voters for reasons
of ideology, beliefs, or political association.
The problem with Justice Kennedy's proposed First Amendment
standard for political gerrymanders is that it seems every bit as malle-
able as a Fourteenth Amendment standard that prohibits "discrimi-
nation" against targeted political groups. The problem with the
Fourteenth Amendment standard is that it can be read either as pro-
hibiting all partisan gerrymanders because they all are meant to favor
one group over another, or no partisan gerrymanders because no
gerrymanders affect anyone's right to vote. Justice Kennedy's First
Amendment standard can be readjust the same way to permit no par-
tisan gerrymanders since the virtual reapportionment map designed
to advance the representational interests of one party over another is
the virtual definition of a partisan gerrymander, or to permit all parti-
san gerrymanders because no voters' rights to vote are affected by
gerrymanders. 6 In effect, Justice Kennedy's First Amendment stan-
dard seems as difficult to define as any of the various Fourteenth
Amendment tests.
At any rate, Vieth largely affirmed the Davis v. Bandemer plurality's
holding that made it almost impossible to mount a successful chal-
lenge to a political gerrymander. In an oral argument before the dis-
trict court, the Larios v. Cox plaintiffs stated that if the court was to
deny their partisan gerrymandering claim (which was dismissed at
summary judgment), it would render Bandemer a 'joke case" because
the Georgia Democrats' partisan gerrymander was so obvious and
significant. Unfortunately for them, Bandemer was practically a joke
case, denying relief in virtually all challenges to political gerryman-
dering. And Vieth, decided several months after the 'joke case"
comment, changed very little.
2. The Racial One Person, One Vote Standard
Partisan deviations from the one person, one vote standard should
probably be held to a higher standard than partisan gerrymandering.
The clearest reason for this is the fact that a racial deviation from the
one person, one vote standard is held to a higher standard than racial
gerrymandering is. Racial gerrymandering is not allowed when "race
was the predominant factor" in drawing district lines.297 The relevant
295 Id. at 1798.
29 Indeed, the Pennsylvania plan that Justice Kennedy voted to uphold was a particularly
egregious gerrymander, calling into question what type of political gerrymander could fail Jus-
tice Kennedy's First Amendment test.
297 See infra Part IIA.3 (discussing the Supreme Court's racial gerrymandering jurispru-
dence); see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491-92 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that "[r]ace cannot be the predominant factor in redistricting under the Court's juris-
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Supreme Court cases do not state that race cannot be a factor at all in
certain circumstances when drawing district shapes. By contrast, the
Court has been quite clear that race cannot be a factor in determin-
ing district size. Reynolds v. Sims had strong words for those who
would consider using race as a factor at all in decisions about the
relative size of voting districts: "the fundamental principle of repre-
sentative government in this country is one of equal representation
for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic
status, or place of residence within a State. " m No case since then has
so much as hinted that helping or hurting voters of a certain race can
be considered a legitimate policy in creating even minor deviations in
population districts. In Karcher v. Daggett, when listing "legitimate ob-
jectives that on a proper showing could justify minor population de-
viations," the Court cautioned that the motives are legitimate only
"[a] s long as the criteria are nondiscriminatory."2 Though perhaps
it is unclear whether this bar on discriminatory motives covers parti-
san political discrimination, there can be no question that it must
cover racial discrimination, as race was the very basis for the passage
of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, it seems clear that race cannot
ever be a motive for the creation of population deviations in reappor-
tionment.
No similar statement of bedrock constitutional principles exists in
the Court's gerrymandering cases. 300 Rather, the racial gerrymander-
ing cases merely admonished legislatures not to go too far by creating
districts whose shapes are too bizarre. Nowhere in the gerrymander-
ing decisions does the Court tell legislatures that they must create dis-
tricts whose shapes are "as normally shaped as is practicable," in the
prudence"); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (stating that race must not simply
have been "a motivation for the drawing of a majority minority district, but the 'predominant fac-
tor' motivating the legislature's districting decision" (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996))); Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) ("The plaintiff's
burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demograph-
ics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district.").
29 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964).
M 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) ("Applying traditional equal protection
principles in the voting-rights context is a most delicate task, however, because a legislature may
be conscious of the voters' races without using race as a basis for assigning voters to districts."
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993)
("[W]e express no view as to whether the intentional creation of majority-minority districts,
without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim." (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)). See generally Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (examining whether
Georgia's Senate redistricting plan resulted in a retrogression of block voters' effective exercise
of the electoral franchise); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (disentangling district-
ing based on legitimate political affiliation from illegitimate race considerations where race and
political affiliation are highly correlated).
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same way that Reynolds told legislatures to create districts that are "as
nearly of equal population as is practicable."' '
So if the standard to be applied to politically motivated one per-
son, one vote deviations is tougher than that applied to political ger-
rymandering, then what, exactly, is the proper standard? Is it never
permissible for a deviation to occur as a direct result of partisan mo-
tives; is it merely unacceptable for partisan considerations to trump
all others in the redistricting plan, or does partisan redistricting only
violate the Equal Protection Clause when it effectively rigs the system
to make one party unable to compete--comparable to Bandemer's po-
litical gerrymandering standard? The Supreme Court has not an-
swered those questions.
3. The Racial Gerrymandering Standard
On the scale of acceptability based on equal protection principles,
the Supreme Court's racial gerrymandering jurisprudence puts that
form of reapportionment manipulation somewhere in between the
extreme permissiveness evident in the political gerrymandering and
the extreme suspicion of racially motivated population deviations.
The middle-ground standard that seems to have evolved for racial
gerrymandering cases has been a predominance standard-namely,
that race cannot be the predominant cause of strange district
shapes.3s2
In Miller v. Johnson,°3 the Court said that, in a racial gerrymander-
ing challenge to an apportionment plan "[t] he plaintiffs burden is to
show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and
demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose,
that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's de-
cision to place a significant number of voters within or without a par-
ticular district. ,0 When such "predominance" is evident, strict scru-
tiny applies.
301 377 U.S. at 577.
302 For comprehensive and insightful treatment of the Court's racial gerrymandering juris-
prudence, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 634-39 (1993); Katharine Inglis
Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A Small Treatise Accompanied by Redistricting Guidelines for
Legislators, Litigants, and Courts, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 137 (2002); Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 3;
Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerrymandering Claims,
1 MICH.J. RACE& L. 47 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in
the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (1996); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be
Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998); and Melissa L. Saun-
ders, A Cautionary Tale: Hunt v. Cromartie and the Next Generation of Shaw Litigation, 1 ELECrION
L.J. 173 (2002).
303 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Id. at 916.
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In Shaw v. Hunt,0 5 the Court upheld this standard, affirming a dis-
trict court decision that had struck down districts whose "overriding,,306 and • • ,,307
purpose and principal reason was to create two majority-black
voting districts 0-by the admission of the state and the plan's princi-
pal drafter. In Hunt v. Cromartie,309 the Court said that "strict scrutiny
applies if race was the 'predominant factor' motivating the legisla-
ture's districting decision. The most recent explication of the ra-
cial gerrymandering standard came in Georgia v. Ashcroft,3 the sister
litigation to Larios. In Ashcrofl, the Court stated that race cannot be
"the predominant, overriding factor" in redistricting decisions.
12
The clear rule of the Court, then, is that districts drawn with race
predominantly in mind are suspect and will be subjected to strict
313
scrutiny. The courts will look both at testimonial evidence of mo-
tives and at the shape of the districts themselves. Miller said that
when "'traditional districting principles such as compactness, conti-
guity, and respect for political subdivisions"' are "subordinated to ra-
cial objectives," strict scrutiny applies.1
4. Extrapolating from the Existing Standards
This grid lays out simplified versions of the standards of scrutiny
for redistricting plans based on their perceived offenses:
Gerrymandering Population Deviation
"race cannot be the
Racial predominant factor"35  never allowed
cannot "shut out" one
Political party or group31 ???
305 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
W6 Id. at 906.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
310 Id. at 547.
311 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
512 Id. at 466 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that "race was a predominant factor" in
the state Senate redistricting plan. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). It is
not clear whether the distinction between requiring that race be a predominant factor rather
than the predominant factor is at all meaningful. This author is inclined to think not.
313 The Court has not imposed different standards on "benign" (favoring minority groups) as
opposed to "invidious" (favoring whites) racial motivations. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,
904-05 (1996) ("[A] racially gerrymandered districting scheme, like all laws that classify citizens
on the basis of race, is constitutionally suspect. This is true whether or not the reason for the
racial classification is benign or the purpose remedial." (internal citations omitted)).
Miller, 515 U.S. at 919 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)).
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This chart makes evident that, according to the Supreme Court,
racial motives are held to somewhat tougher scrutiny than partisan
ones, and one person, one vote deviations are held to tougher scru-
tiny than gerrymandering. This, however, is an easy conclusion to
make. The more difficult question is where along this spectrum the
political population deviation standard should fall. Between the ex-
ceedingly easy Vieth v. Jubelirer standard, which virtually all plans
would pass, and the Karcher v. Daggett standard, which a great many
would fail (the plaintiff would only need to show that plans with
smaller deviations could be drawn without sacrificing legitimate,
nonpartisan redistricting criteria) lies a massive and very significant
gap. Finding a middle ground between these two standards which
may properly be applied to partisan deviations from one person, one
vote is a difficult task.
Logic suggests that the proper standard for partisan one person,
one vote deviations should be quite close, if not identical to, the
standard for racial gerrymandering. The former combines the less
suspect motive (politics) with the more suspect redistricting strategy
(varying district sizes) while the latter combines the more suspect mo-
tive (race) with the less suspect strategy (gerrymandering). Thus, in
essence, the differences cancel out-the difference between race and
politics as suspect motives approximate the difference between gerry-
mandering and population disparities as suspect strategies. In other
words, race is more suspect than partisanship and one person, one
vote deviations are more suspect than gerrymanders, and the degree of
difference is similar.
The overall concept is easiest to picture as a parallelogram, with
each opposing pair of sides being of identical length, as racial gerry-
manders are more suspect than partisan gerrymanders to the exact
same extent that racial one person, one vote deviations are more sus-
pect than partisan one person, one vote deviations:
315 See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001); Hunt, 517 U.S. at 905; Miller, 515
U.S. at 916.
316 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986). But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769
(2004) (concluding that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable for lack of a judi-
cially discernible and manageable standard for adjudicating such claims).
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Racial
one man,
one vote
Racial
Level of gerrymandering Partisan
Scrutiny one man,
Proper for one 
vote
Redistrict-
ing Motive
Partisan
gerrymandering
Redistricting Strategy
At one end, the Court has never recognized any state's right to use
race as a motivation in varying the relative sizes of voting districts. At
the other end, the Court has created a standard for political gerry-
manders that is about as strict as Paris Hilton's parents. In between
them is the "predominance" standard for racial gerrymandering
claims. By extrapolation-while acknowledging that mathematical
precision is impossible in answering this kind of question (or, at least,
equivalent to "how many angels on the head of a pin"-type inquir-
ies)-the racial gerrymandering standard seems quite close to a mid-
point between the totally restrictive racial one person, one vote stan-
dard and the highly permissive Vieth standard. Saying that a motive
cannot be "predominant" seems to be a pretty good compromise be-
tween saying that it is never allowed and that it is almost always al-
lowed. The most plausible way to interpret "predominance" is as
meaning the majority of the reason-that it is responsible for more
than half of the deviation.
Logically speaking, if the difference between race and partisan-
ship as suspect motives equals the difference between one person,
one vote deviations and gerrymandering as suspect redistricting ac-
tions, then the standard applied to political one person, one vote de-
viations should be exactly the same as the standard applied to partisan
one person, one vote disparities. This is because changing one vari-
able has the same effect on the value (the proper scrutiny level) as
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changing the other. 17  That being the case, the constitutional stan-
dard applied to political one person, one vote deviations should
ironically most closely resemble the standard applied to racial gerry-
mandering, which is the suspect redistricting strategy to which parti-
san one person, one vote deviations otherwise bear the least resem-
blance.
It is unknown (and unknowable) whether the proper racial ger-
rymander standard is an exact midpoint between the political gerry-
mander and the racial one person, one vote deviation standard. If it
is not the exact midpoint, it is further unclear whether it is closer to
the former standard or the latter.318 Anyjudicial attempt to draw up a
standard for partisan-inspired deviations from the one person, one
vote ideal that uses only the calculus described above is likely to be-
come an utter laughingstock, accused of being less grounded in con-
stitutional principles than in elementary algebra and freshman phi-
losophy seminars on Logic 101. Nonetheless, it does seem to be a
useful way to conceive of the question, and to understand what the
legal standard for evaluating partisan one person, one vote chal-
lenges should be in comparison with other types of legal challenges
to electoral maps.39 Even though it would not be wise to explicitly
promulgate a rule in the manner of a parallelogram, it is nonetheless
useful to look at the question this way because it provides us with a
good benchmark of how strict the standard should be, even if worded
in a less mathematical way. This parallelogram strongly suggests that
the proper standard to apply to politically motivated one person, one
317 To put it in more stark algebraic terms, Reynolds minus Cromartie equals Cromartie minus
Vieth, or R+ V= 2C.
318 If the Cromartie standard is closer to Reynolds, then the standard for political one person,
one vote (perhaps best referred to as "PlPIV") should be subject to less strict scrutiny than ra-
cial gerrymanders are under the Cromartie standard. If Cromartie is closer to Vieth, then P1P1V
should be a tougher standard than the Cromartie one. The overall equation is P1PlV = Vieth +
(Reynolds- Cromartie). In this author's view, concluding that P1PIV = Cromartie may not be per-
fectly accurate, but it is, as the clich6 goes, close enough for government work. And there is no
more quintessential form of government work than reapportionment.
319 The logical soundness lies in the relative equality of the differences as described: examin-
ing the relevant case law reveals that the Supreme Court considers one person, one vote devia-
tions to be Xworse than gerrymandering. It also considers racial gerrymandering to be Yworse
than political gerrymandering. If X and Y are close in value-and a qualitative examination of
the cases indicates that they seem to be pretty close-then the standard for partisan one person,
one vote deviations should be close to the standard for racial gerrymandering.
The most obvious objection to this logic is that the combination of motives may affect the val-
ues. In other words, although racial gerrymandering may be Yworse than political gerryman-
dering, this does not mean that racial one person, one vote deviations are Yworse than political
one person, one vote deviations (perhaps that difference is some other value Z, and Y Z). Al-
though this is possible, neither constitutional principles nor anything in the case law leads to
this conclusion. Rather, such a conclusion would require some actual evidence as to why one
person, one vote deviations should have a bigger or smaller "gap" in standards between their
racial and political varieties than gerrymandering.
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vote violations is close or identical to the one that applies to racial
gerrymanders-namely, the predominance standard.1
2
P
B. What Do Plaintiffs Need To Prove?
Therefore, if a similar standard applies to political one person,
one vote cases as applies in racial gerrymandering cases, then what
should the standard look like? Applying the predominance standard
would mean that partisan politics cannot be the predominant, over-
riding factor in deviations from one person, one vote equality. This
would seem to imply that politics can be a factor, as fully acknowl-
edged in Gaffney and elsewhere, as long as it does not overwhelm the
other reasons for the way the redistricting map is drawn up.
1. The Problem with Mathematical Determinations
In a real case, how would this standard be applied? Ideally, by de-
termining whether the deviations are due mostly to the fact that the
map drawers wanted to help members of one party-in other words,
that the plan could have feasibly achieved, or at least come substan-
tially closer to, perfect equality without sacrificing any goals other than
partisan gain. For example, say that, in addition to partisan gain, the
creators of a plan also wanted to avoid incumbent-versus-incumbent
races and splitting up towns-two goals that the Courts have ac-
knowledged as legitimate reasons for minor deviations from perfect
equality. ' If it was technically possible to achieve perfect mathemati-
cal equality while still protecting incumbents and avoiding splitting
up municipalities, then the deviation would be the sole result of the
desire for partisan gain. Then, in that sense, partisan gain was the
predominant, overriding factor in the deviation, and the plan would
not pass constitutional muster under this standard.
But what if these goals were all partly responsible for the devia-
tion? Suppose there is a nine percent total deviation, and that per-
fect equality is possible only if the map drawers are willing to forgo
any of the three goals: partisan gain, protecting incumbents, and
preserving municipal boundaries. Furthermore, suppose that the de-
viation would be smaller, though not eliminated, if the map drawers
forgo only the partisan gain goal, while keeping the others. Now, it is
320 See Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he plaintiffs' burden
in establishing racial predominance is a heavy one: 'To invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must
show that the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional dis-
tricting practices.'" (citing Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995))).
32 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (citing a line of precedent that supports
districting and other legislative policies even though there are small differences in the popula-
tion so long as they are consistent with constitutional norms).
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not so clear. What if a nonpartisan plan that helps incumbents and
protects town boundaries has a seven percent deviation? Then, in
that case, the partisanship is responsible for some, though not all, of
the nine percent deviation. In that sense, it is not the predominant
cause of the deviation; it is only responsible for a part of it, which
amounts to less than half. But what if the total deviation of nine per-
cent would be only three percent if partisan goals were not a factor?
Then, two-thirds of the deviation would be due to partisanship, thus
making it the predominant cause of the deviation.
If this were the standard-saying that partisanship cannot be the
cause of more than half of the deviation-what would be the result?
In all likelihood, redistricting planners would be encouraged to "pro-
tect" the partisan goals by using other, less objectionable goals to in-
crease the total deviation. For example, say that the plan's creators
are considering two options: a plan with a three percent deviation,
due entirely to partisan politics, and a plan with a seven percent de-
viation, due both to partisan intentions and other goals (say, preserv-
ing district compactness). Now, the partisan intent is equally signifi-
cant under both plans-but the Court would only uphold the latter
plan under the "predominance" standard, because under it, partisan
intentions are responsible for less than half of the deviation.
It is, of course, true that measuring the individual impact of each
goal in creating the total deviation would not work so simply. For ex-
ample, it is possible that a state's demographic breakdown would
cause a plan that only considers partisan goals in drawing up a plan
to have a five percent deviation; one that only considers compactness
to have a three percent deviation; but one that considers both to have
a nine percent (or seven percent) deviation rather than an eight per-
cent deviation. This is wholly possible and likely, as the two separate
policy goals might complement one another-in the same way that
you can pour ajar full of beads into ajar of marbles and have the to-
tal volume be less than in the two containers prior to the mix, be-
cause beads fill up the space between the marbles. They may also
hinder each other-like Kobe Bryant and Shaquille O'Neal being less
effective as teammates than if each had his own team. How would the
courts deal with this likelihood in applying the predominance stan-
dard? The best way would be to compare the challenged plan with
what it would look like without the partisan push, with other goals in
place, even if the difference does not equal what the deviation would
be when the districts pursue only partisan goals. To take the afore-
mentioned example, if the total deviation is nine percent, the parti-
sanship is responsible for six percent, because, otherwise, the devia-
tion (if it only is due to compactness) would be just three percent,
even though a plan that considered only partisanship but not com-
pactness would have had a deviation of five percent rather than six
percent.
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Under such a system, the cases may cause a battle of the statistical
experts on each side, each of whom would try to minimize or maxi-
mize the degree to which partisanship, as opposed to other goals, was
responsible for the deviation in question. Sorting through the nu-
meric arguments on both sides would be a daunting task, though
perhaps not worse than sorting through the record to determine the
credibility of the various witnesses over whether partisanship was a
major goal of the plan for its creators.
Another result of such a standard would be that redistricting
planners with partisan motives would have an incentive to lard up the
plan with all the items on the Karcher laundry list of legitimate state
policies. The purpose would be to minimize the relative importance
of the portion of the deviation caused by partisanship-not by mak-
ing it smaller, but by making other causes (compactness, incumbent
protection, and so forth) more prominent. The result would be very
large deviations, as planners make a push for a total deviation more
than twice as large as the portion of the deviation due to partisanship.
How come these dire predictions do not occur as a result of the
"predominance" standard as currently applied to racial gerrymander-
ing cases? Mainly because gerrymandering is not as easily quantifi-
able as the subversion of democratic ideals. Deviations from one per-
son, one vote equality are easy to measure by simply counting the
number of people in each district, and it is feasible, with some statis-
tical analysis, to determine the relative importance of the causes of
the deviations. Gerrymanders, by contrast, involve geometry, not
arithmetic. Judgments about the permissibility of various district
shapes necessarily depend more on qualitative judgments-"How
strange does this district look?"-than on quantitative determina-
tions. Though there are mathematical techniques for measuring the
irregularity of district shapes,322 they are more challenging and must
occur at a higher level of expertise than the relatively simple task of
measuring how much each district's population differs from the aver-
age district's size. Since straight mathematical judgments are difficult
for gerrymanders, it is more acceptable to make subjective judgments
as to whether race is a "predominant" cause of the oddly-shaped dis-
tricts, or merely one among many. The Supreme Court and lower
courts have frequently resorted to the eyeball test to evaluate the mo-
tivation behind different district shapes.
32 Examples include the "smallest circle" technique, in which the area of the district is com-
pared to the area of the smallest circle that would encompass the district (the smaller the ratio,
the more irregular the shape); and measuring the ratio of the district's area to the length of its
perimeter (strange, serpentine districts have a low area-to-perimeter ratio, while normal-shaped
squares, circles, and the like have higher ratios).
323 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1993) ("The second majority-black district,
District 12, is even more unusually shaped. It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of
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But with one person, one vote deviations, it is possible to figure
out with reasonable accuracy just how much of the deviation was due
to partisan concerns, simply by figuring out how equal the plan could
have been without it while keeping the plan's other goals in place.
Because it is easier to quantify district size disparities than it is to
quantify odd district shapes, the Supreme Court was able to set forth
a ten percent line for "minor deviations" from equality while it has
never set a similar standard for deviations from geometric normalcy.
For this reason, a "predominance" standard would be easier to apply
in one person, one vote cases than in gerrymandering cases (while
making reasonable allowances for Karcher's warning that "we [do
not] ... indicate that a plan cannot represent a good-faith effort
whenever a court can conceive of minor improvements.")
324
In fact, in one person, one vote cases, a straight numbers analysis
would therefore be possible not only with a "predominance" stan-
dard, but with any standard that assesses whether, and to what de-
gree, the deviation was caused by partisan goals as opposed to more
acceptable ones. Also, any application of a "but for" standard-one
that says partisan motives are impermissible if they are responsible for
the deviation being as large as it is-would be a very harsh standard
indeed. It would essentially foreclose on any plan in which partisan
goals increased the deviation, even by 0.1%, and even if they were
only partly responsible for it.
Even though one person, one vote cases would seem to lend
themselves relatively well to quantitative analysis of the impact of par-
tisan gain on the deviation, no judicial opinion in a one person, one
vote case to date-with the arguable exception of Vigo--has per-
formed quantitative analysis to determine whether and to what de-
gree partisan politics is responsible for the population deviations in a
redistricting plan. This is because similar cases such as Cecere, Montiel,
Marylanders, and Hulme have applied varying and non-specific stan-
dards and have frankly not analyzed the proper standard with par-
ticular rigor. None appear to have tried to make such a measure-
ment. In Cecere, this was because the court flat-out stated that even if
the deviation was one hundred percent due to partisanship, the plan
was still perfectly acceptable.
2 5
The fact that one can feasibly measure the degree to which a re-
stricted parameter such as race or politics influences a plan is actually
its length, no wider than the [Interstate]-85 corridor. It winds in snake-like fashion through
tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobbles in enough en-
claves of black neighborhoods.'" (internal citation omitted)).
3 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740 n.10.
325 Cecere v. County of Nassau, 274 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[Sluch conduct,
although perhaps a violation of state law, is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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a problem in applying a constitutional standard, because of the poten-
tial for abuse that could result. In a sense, wishy-washy legal stan-
dards are more desirable than hard-and-fast ones, because they pro-
voke uncertainty on the part of those who might play around with
hard-and-fast standards and therefore make it more risky to try to
game the system. The proverbial Holmesian Bad Man drawing up a
voting plan and facing a "predominance" standard of scrutiny might
think to himself, "Okay, I want to create a deviation of four percent to
promote my partisan goals. I had better use other goals such as com-
pactness and incumbent protection to make the total deviation at
least 8.01%, so that the partisan element does not predominate."
Such thinking by redistricters is not only likely, it is virtually guaran-
teed. The political incentives to push population deviations to the
limit are so strong that those who draw district lines are likely to ex-
ploit such deviations as far as they can-just as huge numbers of state
and local plans now have maximum deviations between 9.9 and 10
percent, because that is the perceived legal safe harbor. Legislatures
across the country are filled with Holmesian Bad Men who will push
the limits of whatever rule-based standard is created.
If an alternative standard is used-say, for instance, a standard
that partisan goals cannot be a "significant" or "substantial" factor in
the deviation-then at first, those who draw district lines will have lit-
tle idea of how far they can go with partisanship, and will instead
make conservative assumptions. But eventually, courts would mark
off what degree of deviation due to political motives is "significant"
enough to warrant invalidation, and from then on every plan will be
drawn just to the left of that line, as is the case with so many current
apportionment plans throughout the country with respect to the ten
percent "minor deviation" standard.
The most obvious solution to the problem of dealing with redis-
tricters who want to push the limits of any standard is to set forth a
rule that no deviation due to partisanship is permitted. It has the ad-
vantage of simplicity, because it simply says that any deviation due to
this factor is not allowed, and therefore, all deviations must be af-
firmatively justified by some other legitimate policy. It has the disad-
vantage, however, of being an improper standard to apply to partisan-
inspired deviations in state legislative districting. For the reasons dis-
cussed above, it is likely that significant (albeit minor) deviations are
permissible in such cases without violating the Equal Protection
Clause, and the question is to what extent partisan concerns motivate
legislative districting. It is also clear that for deviations under ten
percent, the burden is on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that there is
an Equal Protection Clause violation, and they must point to some-
thing other than the deviation itself in demonstrating that violation.
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2. Process-Based Analysis
One way to deal with the problem of teasing out the degree to
which partisan concerns were "predominant" or "substantial" causes
of voting district deviations is to go beyond actual numeric analysis
and examine the record to determine the subjective intent of the
plan's creators. This way, there would be no bright-line rule about
what percentage of the deviation must be the result of partisan mo-
tives for it to be impermissible. Rather, it would be a qualitative
analysis of the process that led to the plan, instead of the actual num-
bers inherent in the plan that resulted. This was the clear method
employed by the court in Hulme v. Madison County, which took the so-
ciopathic behavior of the official who drew up the plan as evidence
that it was motivated by nothing more or less than blatant partisan-
ship.326 An advantage of this move away from a purely statistical ex-
amination is that it would be more difficult for those who draw dis-
trict lines to take advantage of the rule by testing its limits, because
courts would be making far more subjective judgments applying this
rule than they would if they simply ran the numbers to see how much
of the deviation was due to partisan motives. In addition, courts
might be better equipped to answer this type of question and would
be less beholden to the experts-courts are better at assessing mo-
tives and political processes than at performing regression analyses.
3. Electoral Impact of Deviations
In addition, a workable standard could also require that the plain-
tiffs demonstrate that the deviations in the plan actually did have or
will have an electoral impact, as evidenced by how the victimized
party is affected in subsequent elections. Davis v. Bandemer held that
an examination of the effects was essential to the analysis of political
gerrymandering claims-it was necessary to find not only intentional
discrimination, but also an actual discriminatory effect.3 27 And cer-
tainly it makes sense not to overturn a plan that, whatever the intent
of the planners, did not actually hurt their political opponents. It
would be inappropriate to hold that the degree of effect required by
Bandemer-that the plaintiffs have been "shut out" of the political328
process 8-should also be the standard for one person, one vote
claims. Doing so would effectively guarantee that no major-party
plaintiff in any state could ever survive summary judgment on a one
326 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
327 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (holding that, to succeed, the plaintiffs
would have to prove "both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and
an actual discriminatory effect on that group.").
328 Id. at 139.
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person, one vote claim, since for decades each party has had a signifi-
cant presence in every state in the country, and there are no signs
that this will change any time soon. Rather, some other less strict
standard of actual effect should be used. For example, if ninety-five
percent of the voters in a state are Democrats, but gerrymandering
and differently sized districts lead them to control only forty percent
of the seats in the state House, this clearly goes against the spirit of
Reynolds v. Sims, which stated that,
[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the
State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of
votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be con-
tended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had
not been effectively diluted.
329
If a plan's population deviation is very close to ten percent, this is
itself evidence of some kind of bad faith, in that there was no real ef-
fort to achieve perfect equality, and the only goal was to avoid the
prima facie unconstitutionality that would result from a deviation of
more than ten percent. Still, even if the effort to achieve equality was
not as conscientious as it should have been, the plaintiffs must show
that the causes of the deviation were not among the acceptable rea-
sons that Karcher mentions, or comparable ones. Furthermore, as
Bandemer suggests, partisan politics are not necessarily among these
reasons.
4. Proportional Standards
Another important principle to remember is the one mentioned
in Karcher
The showing required to justify population deviations is flexible, depend-
ing on the size of the deviations, the importance of the State's interests,
the consistency with which the plan as a whole reflects those interests,
and the availability of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those
interests yet approximate population equality more closely.
33°
The larger the deviation, the more compelling the justification for
the deviation must be. While 9.99% may be a "minor deviation" for
burden-of-proof purposes, it is certainly not an insubstantial one. In
the legislatures of states with deviations close to ten percent, some
representatives may represent thousands or tens of thousands more
people than their colleagues across the aisle with equal voting power.
The result is that the legislators who represent a minority of the
529 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
350 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 741 (1983). Although that statement occurred in the
context of a discussion of congressional rather than state legislative redistricting, there is no
reason to think that the Court did not intend it to be equally applicable in the latter case as
well.
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state's voters can command a majority of the state legislature-and
unlike the partisan effects of trivially small deviations in congressional
plans, this is not such a remote possibility.
In plans with deviations approaching (or exceeding) ten percent,
the state policies justifying the deviation should be fairly compelling
ones. Compactness, incumbent protection, and preserving natural
and municipal boundaries are all ones that might qualify. Partisan
politics and maintaining rural voter power are more suspect. The
relative importance of each reason is important in judging the consti-
tutionality of the plan. The most correct standard in finding the plan
unconstitutional on the ground of excessive partisanship would be
the predominance standard. Clearly, the standard for partisan one
person, one vote deviations should be comparable to the standard for
racial gerrymandering. It is arguable that partisan one vote devia-
tions should be held to a higher standard of scrutiny than racial ger-
rymanders, because the individual constitutional principles at stake in
one person, one vote cases are so much more obvious and direct than
they are for gerrymandering cases. However, one should be cautious
about saying the proper level of scrutiny is such that the plaintiffs
only have to demonstrate that partisan gain was a "substantial" or "sig-
nificant" cause of the deviation."' This is because the Court has
made clear that (1) because it is primarily the responsibility of the
legislative branch of state governments, politics is an inevitable aspect
of redistricting, both in practical reality and as codified in the Consti-
tution 31; and (2) courts should be reluctant to step in to overturn the
redistricting plans of legislatures.
At the same time, though, partisan gain is a suspect motive-if it
were not, then a majority of the Court in Vieth v.Jubelire34 would have
held partisan gerrymanders are uniformly nonjusticiable. Even if
partisan gain is an inevitable aspect of the redistricting process, the
Karcher proportionality rule still applies to all population deviations,
and it is not clear that partisan gains are ajustification for a deviation
1 This is similar to the standard currently applied in mixed motive Title VII cases, where "an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment prac-
tice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); see
also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussing this provision and the mixed
motive in a Title VII case brought by a female warehouse worker).
332 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("District lines are rarely neutral phe-
nomena .... The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial
political consequences.").
3 See id. at 749 ("Nor is the goal of fair and effective representation furthered by making the
standards of reapportionment so difficult to satisfy that the reapportionment task is recurringly
removed from legislative hands and performed by federal courts which themselves must make
the political decisions necessary to formulate a plan ... ").
334 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
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as substantial as ten percent. If it were one of many factors that all
added up to nearly ten percent, and most of those factors were more
obviously acceptable ones, then the plan should probably pass mus-
ter. But, if plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that all or nearly all of
the ten percent is due to partisanship-in the sense that all the "le-
gitimate" goals of the plan could have been accomplished to the
same or a greater degree with a much smaller or nonexistent devia-
tion-then partisanship predominated and the plan violates the
Equal Protection Clause.
5. The Case for a Guideline-Based Mixed Analysis
As mentioned above, there are two ways to assess the "predomi-
nance" of the plan, each with its own advantages and disadvantages.
The first is to examine the record to figure out what the drafters had
in mind when drawing up the plan. Numerous factors may have been
considered, and partisan gain, if a factor at all, may have been a very
minor one. If the plaintiffs are unable to refute that, then they will
lose under a "predominance" standard. One way they might refute it
would be by pointing to the most obviously damning partisan result
of the plan: the fact that all the +4.9% districts are Republican-
majority, and all the -4.9% districts are Democratic-majority, or vice
versa. Even if the defense counters that the small districts were in-
tended not for pure partisan gain but to protect incumbents, the
plaintiffs may counter that it seems odd that all these small districts
were meant to protect only incumbents from one party, or that some
of the -4.9% districts were in areas favoring the drafting party but
were open seats. In addition, the plaintiffs can retort, "Fine, that may
explain why all the smallest districts are Democratic-but why are all
the largest districts Republican? What reason, other than a naked de-
sire to give the screwgie to the GOP, would explain such an improb-
able result?"
This predicted exchange (possibly more sophisticated than the
way it is recounted here, though possibly not) is one way that a court
can assess whether partisan goals were the predominant reason for
population deviations. The other significant way is through quantita-
tive analysis, of the type discussed earlier. In essence, this type of
analysis would come down to a battle of experts, each trying to dem-
onstrate why partisanship was or was not the primary cause of the
9.98% deviation. Even if their statistical methods are the same, each
side's experts will base their conclusions on a different set of assump-
tions. The plaintiff's expert will say, "I can come up with a plan that
protects incumbents and preserves municipal boundaries (and what-
ever other goals the planners say they want) to the same extent as the
challenged plan did, and can do so with a deviation of much less than
9.99%. The planners had access to the same computer technology
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for redistricting as I did. Therefore, it is obvious that partisan gain
was a big part of the reason for the deviation." The defense expert
will respond, "You do not account for all the things we had to worry
about. There were a hundred specific, personalized, and legitimate
factors that contributed to the plan we drew up, and there is no way
you can account for all those in drawing up your simplified plan." It
will be up to the court to assess the relative credibility and relevance
of each expert's testimony and studies.
Whether the court relies on the numeric analysis or the testimo-
nial record or both, it will be necessary to sort out the relative impor-
tance of the factors that led to the deviation in the plan. This
method therefore becomes a kind of mixed motive analysis. Mixed
motive suits also occur in the areas of Title VII and Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, but most usefully to us, courts have assessed
mixed motives in racial gerrymandering cases. Bush v. Vera 3 36 may be
the most useful of these cases. There, the Court was charged with
addressing a defense argument that, in addition to creating majority-
minority districts, the challenged Texas 3 lan also considered other
goals, primarily incumbency protection. The Court analyzed the
challenged districts individually to see whether race predominated as
the motivation behind the shape they were given, and concluded that
it did. With respect to one district, the Court concluded that "[t]he
record discloses intensive and pervasive use of race both as a proxy to
protect the political fortunes of adjacent incumbents, and for its own
sake in maximizing the minority population of District 30 regardless
of traditional districting principles. 38 It rejected the claim that the
shape of another district was meant to protect two "functional in-
335 The defense in partisan one person, one vote cases might also claim that the plans do not
discriminate against voters from one party because voters from the other party comprise only a
slight majority in many of the smallest districts, and voters from the disfavored party only have a
small majority in the largest ones. This would be the likely result of any plan that gerrymanders
in favor of one party. Here is where the two common defense arguments-the "we did not care
about partisan gain" defense and the "many in the smallest districts are from the plaintiffs'
party" argument-would crash into one another. In reality, the fact that nearly half of the vot-
ers in the smallest districts are from the plaintiffs' party would only point to the nakedness of
the partisan grab. The most effective gerrymander is not one that guarantees the map-drawing
party 100% of the vote in a given district, but is rather the one that guarantees the party 50.1%
of the vote. That way, no more party voters are put into the district than the minimum amount
necessary to ensure victory for the party in that district, allowing the rest of the party members
to be put into districts that may be more competitive. The fact that nearly half of the voters in
underpopulated districts are from the plaintiffs' party does not point to the map drafters' inno-
cence of and obliviousness to partisan motives in drawing up the redistricting map; quite to the
contrary, it shows knowledge of the best way to maximize the favored party's representation in
the state legislature through redistricting.
517 U.S. 952 (1996).
37 Id. at 959.
Id. at 972-73.
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cumbents," finding that "such influences were overwhelmed in the
determination of the districts' bizarre shapes by the State's efforts to
maximize racial divisions. '"3" It also rejected claims that district
boundaries were drawn along partisan lines that happened to corre-
late with race, because both districts in question were solidly Democ-
ratic.30 In making these determinations that race predominated, the
Court used numerous means at its disposal: testimony of officials, as-
sessment of the relative sophistication of the technologies used with
respect to race as opposed to other goals, and objective assessment of
the degree to which the Texas plan furthered the goal of majorin-
minority districts as opposed to furthering the other state goals.
This was not a stark, number-crunching analysis, but rather a combi-
nation of methods that led the Court to its gestalt of a conclusion.
Justice Stevens's dissent in Shaw v. Hunt also contains an interest-
342ing discussion of mixed motives in racial gerrymandering cases.
Justice Stevens remarked that "legislative decisions are often the
product of compromise and mixed motives. For that reason, I have
always been skeptical about the value of motivational analysis as a ba-
sis for constitutional adjudication. 43  Justice Stevens was, under-
standably, "particularly skeptical of such an inquiry in a case of this
type, as mixed motivations would seem to be endemic to the en-
deavor of political districting."3" The majority did not have similar
reservations, however, and performed what was essentially a mixed
motive analysis (though they did not use that term) to find that the
North Carolina plan at issue did not withstand strict scrutiny.34 5
The most effective way to conduct a "predominance" inquiry,
then, would be one that relies on record evidence about the motiva-
tions at play in the process that led to the adoption of a redistricting
map containing population deviations. Additionally, the inquiry
should rely on mathematical analysis showing that a plan could easily
have been drawn up that gets rid of most of the existing deviations
while still adhering to the other, nonpolitical policies that were be-
hind the deviations. The inquiry should also determine that the elec-
toral impact of the population deviations is significant. This is a
workable, feasible standard that conforms with both the one person,
one vote case law and the usual type of inquiries that courts have
made in similar areas of law.
3" Id. at 975.
340 Id.
34 Id. at 959-63.
342 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 940 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343 Id.
W Id.
34 See id. at 918 (majority opinion) ("We hold, therefore, that District 12 is not narrowly tai-
lored to the State's asserted interest .... ").
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CONCLUSION
Partisan-inspired redistricting has always been a part of the politi-
cal landscape in this country. It is as strong now as it ever has been,
with new technologies that allow map drawers to maximize their par-
tisan goals while keeping population deviations at 9.9%. According
to one measure, partisan apportionment is the reason why there were
only one quarter as many competitive congressional races in 2002 as
there were in elections just a decade earlier.34 The creation of so
many safe seats contributes to the polarization of American politics.
This polarization does not mainly occur at the level of individual vot-
ers. Rather, it occurs because politicians who are elected to office
only have to cater to voters from one party, and such politicians-
either out of conviction or out of political prudence-tend to fall fur-
ther from the ideological center than do politicians who have to
reach out to voters from both parties to get elected. This is not to say
that politicians with "extreme" views should not have a voice in
American politics, but rather that such views are represented in gov-
ernment in considerably higher proportions than in the total voting
population.
In every state, whoever can command a legislative majority con-
trols the redistricting process. This is inevitable and was surely on the
minds of the constitutional framers who gave state legislatures re-
sponsibility for districting. But there are limits to how far "politics"
can go. It cannot be used as a blanket justification for all manner of
questionable redistricting decisions. This principle is even more sig-
nificant when apportionment results in the creation of voting districts
with populations that vary significantly according to the best available
census measures. One person, one vote is a bedrock constitutional
principle, and although perfect equality is not required, it is neces-
sary to point to a legitimate state policy when explaining why a plan
did not reach perfect equality, especially when the available technol-
ogy makes this goal wholly feasible. This Article has argued that al-
though partisan politics may play some part in population deviations,
it would probably violate the Equal Protection Clause if politics were
solely or predominantly responsible for districts approaching a ten
percent total deviation. The fact that a deviation is less than ten per-
cent does not give map drawers a safe harbor, but it does place the
burden of proof on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that such deviations
as do exist were caused by illegitimate motives.
SeeJohn Harwood, House Incumbents Tap Census, Software to Get a Lock on Seats, WALL ST. J.,
June 19, 2002, at Al (explaining how gerrymandering led to more "safe" congressional seats in
2002).
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As such, the proper standard in a one person, one vote challenge
based on partisan motives would require plaintiffs to demonstrate,
through the case record and statistical analysis, that partisan advan-
tage was both a predominant motivation for and a significant result of
the population deviation. This may be a tall order for some plaintiffs,
but it is not an insurmountable standard when the burden of proof is
one of preponderance. Judicial opinions striking down such plans
would have to emphasize that those who drew district lines pushed
their luck by going so close to ten percent in so many districts that it
called into question their commitment to perfect equality, as opposed
to simply achieving a goal that would be easier to defend in court. If
a number of plans are struck down for being overly partisan, it is pos-
sible that more states will turn to independent commissions to draw
reapportionment maps. 47 Or maybe they will simply resort to pure
partisan gerrymandering that creates bizarre district shapes while
keeping district populations equal. After all, creating population de-
viations between districts is by no means the only tool in partisan re-
districters' bags of tricks, and is probably not even the most potent
one. There is no doubt that a litany of manipulations is possible
through gerrymandering even if district populations are identical.
Even if this result occurs, however, it will still constitute progress be-
cause deviations from the one person, one vote ideal continue to un-
dermine the voting power of citizens across the country.
347 For discussions of the benefits and pitfalls of these commissions, see Christopher C. Con-
fer, To Be About the People's Business: An Examination of the Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legisla-
tive Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 115 (2003-2004), and Samuel Issa-
charoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1643, 1693-1702 (1993).
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